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Maybe Professor Fratcher was not so wrong after all.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Law and economics scholars assert that there is a natural
tendency for legal systems to favor efficient rules over inefficient
1
rules. Moreover, for the law to remain efficient, as conditions
2
change, so too must the law. The evolution of the law concerning a
trustee’s powers and a third party’s liability for participating in a
breach of trust generally supports these propositions. The standard
of liability for third parties participating in a breach of trust, as set
forth in the recently adopted Uniform Trust Code, however, does
not.
From an economic perspective, the standard of liability for
participating in a breach of trust allocates the risk of harm associated
with a breach of trust between the trust beneficiaries and the third
party who participated in the breach. Allocating all or part of the
harm to a party creates incentives for that party to take precautions to
minimize the risk of a breach, thereby reducing the expected costs of
∗

Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A., 1979, University
of Chicago; M.A., 1980, St. Louis University; J.D., 1983, University of Chicago. I
would like to thank Professors Larry Waggoner, Daniel Cole, John Langbein, Mark
Ascher, Susan French, Robert Pushaw, Bob Whitman, and David English for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank
Melissa Niemann, Brooke Loesby, Virginia Monken, and Theona Zhordania-Taat for
their invaluable research assistance.
1
See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
ANTHOLOGY 501 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27 (5th ed.
1998); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
38, 62–63 (1985); Marc J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641, 641 (1996); see also infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of what constitutes
efficiency.
2
Roe, supra note 1, at 663–64; Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977).
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3

harm allocated to it. Efficiency is promoted when the total expected
costs associated with a breach of trust (the costs of the precautions
plus the costs of a breach plus the administrative costs) are
4
minimized.
At common law, a third party who participated in a breach of
5
trust was basically strictly liable. By allocating virtually all the harm
associated with a breach to the third party, the law created an
incentive for third parties who dealt with a trustee to take
precautions—to engage in a broad inquiry—to reduce the risk of
6
harm by ensuring that the transaction was authorized. Although the
broad duty of inquiry was costly, it minimized the expected costs of a
7
breach by minimizing the probability of a breach. In light of the
nature and purpose of the common law trust, to preserve the trust
8
property, this approach was efficient.
Over time, however, the purpose of the trust changed from
9
preserving the trust property to managing it. As applied to the modern
trust, the common law standard of liability became cumbersome and
10
inefficient. Imposing the common law broad duty of inquiry to the
modern trust each and every time a trustee proposed to transact
11
would result in substantial costs with little offsetting benefit.
Eliminating the common law broad duty of inquiry would
substantially reduce the transaction costs for third parties interested
in dealing with a trustee, thereby improving efficiency.
12
The Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (“UTPA”) adopts this
economic approach and completely abolishes the common law broad
3

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 300–11 (3d ed.
2000); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
4
DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 214
(2005); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300–01.
5
See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
6
See infra Part V.B.
7
See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
11
See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the costs and benefits.
12
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act in 1964. UNIF. TRS. POWERS ACT, 7C U.L.A. 388
(2000) [hereinafter UTPA]. The UTPA had been adopted in sixteen states, though
several of them have adopted the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) and repealed the
UTPA. See id.; UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2003), 7C U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 2004)
[hereinafter UTC]. Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming have already adopted the
UTC and repealed the UTPA. See UTC, 7C U.L.A. 143. In addition, the adoption of
the UTC and the repeal of the UTPA was effective in Nebraska as of January 1, 2005,
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13

duty of inquiry. The UTPA automatically grants each trustee broad
14
powers over the trust property and provides that a third party who
deals with a trustee is not liable unless he or she had actual
15
knowledge that the transaction constituted a breach of trust. The
actual knowledge standard of liability allocates virtually all of the risk
of harm associated with a breach of trust to the settlor and trust
beneficiaries, thereby creating an incentive for them to take
16
precautions to minimize the risk of a breach.
Like the UTPA, the recently adopted Uniform Trust Code
17
(“UTC”) also grants each trustee broad powers over the trust
property and abolishes the common law broad duty of inquiry, but
the UTC protects a third party who deals with a trustee only if the
18
third party acted in good faith. The good faith standard of liability
implicitly imposes a limited duty to inquire when the third party
suspects or has reason to suspect that the proposed transaction
19
constitutes a breach of trust. By imposing a limited duty of inquiry,
the good faith standard bifurcates the allocation of harm between the
third party and the trust beneficiaries depending on the situation.
This bifurcation creates incentives for both parties to take
20
precautions to minimize the risk of a breach of trust.
All things being equal, prevailing law and economics theory and
the success of the good faith standard in other areas of law support
the position that the UTC’s good faith approach is more efficient
21
than the UTPA’s actual knowledge approach.
The problem,
however, is that all things are not equal. Courts and juries have a
natural “hindsight bias” in favor of trust beneficiaries and against the
and will be effective in Arizona on January 1, 2006. Id. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws no longer lists the UTPA as a uniform law.
Id. at 144.
13
UTPA § 7, 7C U.L.A. 431.
14
Id. § 2(a), 7C U.L.A. 398.
15
Id. § 7, 7C U.L.A. 431.
16
See infra note 67 and discussion accompanying notes 187–88; see also notes 200–
14 and accompanying text.
17
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted
the UTC on August 3, 2000. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000) and Its
Application to Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). “[M]inor cleanup amendments
were approved in August 2001.” David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000):
Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 144 (2000). The UTC has
been adopted in five states (Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming)
as of the writing of this Article. See UTC, 7C U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 2004).
18
See infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 173–77, 260–63 and accompanying text.
20
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 304–11; Cooter, supra note 3, at 7–8.
21
See infra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
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trustee and any third party who dealt with the trustee. Hindsight
bias increases the risk that a third party erroneously will be held liable
for participating in the breach. In addition, there are higher
23
administrative costs associated with the good faith standard. When
the increased litigation costs and risk of an erroneous judgment are
factored into the analysis, the actual knowledge standard arguably is
24
more efficient than the good faith standard.
Although the actual knowledge standard of liability arguably is
the more efficient approach, imposing a limited duty of inquiry is the
25
more equitable approach.
To the extent one believes that the
added equitable consideration makes the limited duty of inquiry the
“better” approach, the bad faith standard of liability should be
favored over the good faith standard. The bad faith standard of
liability helps to counter the natural judicial bias in favor of trust
beneficiaries and reduces the litigation costs and risk of an erroneous
26
judgment against a third party due to hindsight bias.
II. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
The issue of a third party’s liability for participating in a breach
27
of trust presupposes (1) a trust, and (2) a breach of trust. A trust
arises when one party, the settlor, transfers property to a second
28
party, the trustee, for the benefit of a third party, the beneficiary.
29
The trustee typically holds legal title, while the beneficiaries hold

22

See infra notes 191–227 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 228–53 and accompanying text.
24
See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 183, 255–58 and accompanying text.
26
See infra Part VII for an analysis of the differences between the good faith and
bad faith standards.
27
For a general discussion of a third party’s liability for participating in a breach
of trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS ch. 9, §§ 283–326 (1959); GEORGE T.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 881–912 (rev. 2d ed. 1995 & Supp.
2002); 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§§ 283–326 (4th ed. 1989). Although the Restatement (Third) of Trusts has been
adopted, it does not yet contain any corresponding provisions that would alter the
positions set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts concerning a third party’s
liability for participating in a breach of trust.
28
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 3, 10 (2003); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; 1
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 3 to 3.2 (4th ed. 1987); John H. Langbein, The
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632 (1995).
29
The trustee typically holds legal title to the trust property. This is not required,
however. The trust property may be an equitable interest. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d, § 42 cmt. a; BOGERT supra note 27, §§ 1, 146; 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 27, § 2.6 (4th ed. 1987).
23
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30

equitable title. A breach of trust occurs when the trustee exceeds
31
the scope of his or her authority over the trust property, or when the
trustee violates one or more of the fiduciary duties the trustee owes
32
the beneficiaries. Where the breach involves a third party, the issue
that arises is when should the third party be liable for participating in
33
the breach of trust.
Although there are a variety of ways in which a third party may
34
be involved in a breach of trust, the most common scenario arises
when a trustee conveys trust property to the third party in exchange
for other property or services, and the transaction constitutes a
35
breach of trust.
While the beneficiaries can sue the trustee for
36
37
breach of trust, they might also be able to sue the third party. If
the third party is liable, the beneficiaries can recover the trust
38
property from the third party; and if that is not an adequate remedy,
39
the beneficiaries may also recover damages from the third party.
In many respects, the issue of a third party’s liability for
participating in a breach of trust is simply a variation of the age old
question: When can a party who lacks good title nevertheless transfer
30

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d, § 42 cmt. a; BOGERT, supra note 27,
§§ 146, 181; 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 2.7 (4th ed. 1987); see also
Langbein, supra note 28, at 632, 636.
31
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 cmt. b; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra
note 27, §§ 163A to 164 (4th ed. 1987).
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 cmt. c, ch. 7, topic 2, introductory
note; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 861; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 170–85
(4th ed. 1987); 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 201 (4th ed. 1988).
33
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–326; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 901; 4
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 293–326 (4th ed. 1989).
34
BOGERT, supra note 27, § 901.
35
“Typical examples of this situation are where the trustee in breach of trust
transfers trust property to a third person, who may or may not be a bona fide
purchaser, or where a personal creditor of the trustee attaches or levies on trust
property.” 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 279A (4th ed. 1989); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–93; BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 881–905.
36
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 861; 3
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 205 (4th ed. 1988).
37
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 295; BOGERT, supra note 27, § 871; 4
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 295 (4th ed. 1989).
38
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 291(1)(a), 292(1); BOGERT, supra note
27, §§ 868, 901; 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 291, 291.1, 292 (4th ed.
1989). The third party can then sue the trustee to recover the consideration it gave
to the trustee. From an economic perspective, the third party bears the risk that the
trustee is judgment proof. Another way to think about the issue is to ask: Who
should bear the risk that the trustee is judgment proof—the trust beneficiaries or the
third party who participated in the breach of trust?
39
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 291(1)(b)–(c), 292(2)–(3); BOGERT,
supra note 27, §§ 868, 901; 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 291, 291.2, 291.3,
292 (4th ed. 1989).
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40

good title to a third party? The answer depends on the interplay of
property law, commercial law, equity, settlor’s intent, and the nature
of a trust—and it is best to analyze this interplay from a historical
perspective.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. Early Common Law Approach
1.

The Law of Property

At early common law, any third party who dealt with someone
acting on behalf of another was strictly liable if the transaction turned
out to be unauthorized. This approach was based upon the classic
41
property rule of nemo dat quod non habet —”no one can give what he
42
has not.” If a party did not hold good title, that party could not
transfer good title unless the owner expressly consented to that
43
transfer. This rule was absolute at early common law. Even where
an owner transferred property to an agent, the agent could not
transfer title to a third party unless the owner consented to the
44
particular transaction in question.

40

The starting point for this issue is a classic property rule. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 cmt. b. The issue can arise in a plethora of different
situations where a third party deals with one who is acting on behalf of another party
(e.g., principal and agent, bailor and bailee, employer and employee, estate and
personal representative). 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 12 (4th ed. 1987).
The question then becomes whether a third party’s liability for participating in a
breach of trust is simply a subset of this larger issue, such that the same standard of
liability should apply, or whether there is something unique about the trust situation
that warrants treating a third party who deals with a trustee differently.
41
“No one can give that which he has not.” THE SELF-PRONOUNCING LAW
DICTIONARY 559 (2d students ed. 1948).
42
2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 311 (rev. ed. 1948); see also William D. Warren, Cutting
Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470
(1963) (“No one can transfer to another a better title to goods than he himself
has.”).
43
“The initial common law position was that equities of ownership are to be
protected at all costs: an owner may never be deprived of his property rights without
his consent.” Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954); see also 1A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 75 (4th ed.
1987).
44
Warren, supra note 42, at 470 (stating that “the courts . . . went to extremes to
protect the principal from the consequences of even slight deviations by the agent
from the authority granted him” (citing 2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 317 (rev. ed.
1948))). Also, “[i]n § 317 Professor Williston collects the cases where the agent
though he may be authorized to sell the goods to some person or upon some terms,
is not authorized to sell them to the person or upon the terms on which the sale was
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The rule favoring absolute protection of ownership worked well
at early common law. Most transactions were personal transactions,
conducted face-to-face between a buyer and seller who usually lived
45
near each other. The buyer was expected either to know the seller,
or to inquire as to the seller’s rights to transfer the property in
46
question. The buyer bore all of the risk that the seller might not
47
have good title to transfer. Placing this risk on the buyer protected
owners by imposing a broad duty on the buyer to inquire diligently
48
into the seller’s title and/or authority to sell before purchasing.
2.

The Law of Trusts

As applied to trusts, the interests of trust beneficiaries were well
protected under the common law rule favoring absolute protection
of ownership. A third party wishing to deal with a trustee did so at its
own risk. If the transaction turned out to constitute a breach of trust,
49
the third party was liable for participating in the breach. Placing the
risk of loss on the third party protected trust beneficiaries by
imposing a broad duty on a third party to inquire diligently into the
trustee’s title and/or authority to sell before dealing with the
50
trustee. Despite the costs inherent in the broad duty of inquiry,
imposing the duty on third parties who were interested in dealing
with a trustee promoted efficiency.

in fact made.” Warren, supra note 42, at 470 n.10 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“The initial common law position was that
equities of ownership are to be protected at all costs: an owner may never be
deprived of his property rights without his consent. That worked well enough
against a background of local distribution where seller and buyer met face to face
and exchanged goods for cash.”).
46
Warren, supra note 42, at 470.
47
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“Classical theory required that the principal
be protected and that the risks of agency distribution be cast on the purchaser.”).
The early common law approach could be summed up in the well-known phrase
“buyer beware.”
48
See generally Warren, supra note 42.
49
A third party who knew or should have known that he or she was dealing with a
trustee had a duty to inquire into whether the trustee had the power to engage in the
transaction in question. In addition, the third party was charged with proper
construction of the trust terms. The combined effect was that if a third party dealt
with a trustee and the transaction constituted a breach of trust, the third party was
strictly liable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 297 cmts. f to i (1959); BOGERT,
supra note 27, §§ 565, 894; 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 297.3–297.4 (4th
ed. 1989).
50
4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 297.3–297.4 (4th ed. 1989).
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Economic Primer on Efficiency

From an economic perspective, laws create incentives that affect
51
people’s behavior. In deciding which types of incentives should be
created, law and economics assumes that all things being equal,
52
efficiency should be favored.
Efficiency maximizes utility and
53
wealth and is generally promoted by the free and voluntary
54
exchange of resources.
There are two widely accepted definitions of efficiency. The first
is the Pareto approach. A Pareto superior transaction is one where
after the transaction at least one party is better off, and no one is
55
worse off. The second definition of efficiency is the Kaldor-Hicks
approach. Under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, after the transaction
one or more parties may be worse off, but the benefits to those who
56
are better off exceed the harm to those who are worse off. Under
the Paretian approach, any party harmed must be compensated to
ensure that no party is worse off as a result of the transaction. In
contrast, under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, a harmed party does not
have to be compensated for the transaction to be efficient. The
transaction need only generate sufficient benefits for the parties who
gained that they could compensate the harmed parties and still be
57
better off.
58
The Pareto approach also maximizes individual autonomy.
Under this approach, a transaction is wealth maximizing only if each
party actually consents to that particular transaction. In contrast, the
51

Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (2000).
52
POSNER, supra note 1, at 13, 27.
53
Id. at 12–15. Wealth and utility are not the same; but a discussion of the
differences and why most economists use wealth as a substitute for utility is beyond
the scope of this Article.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 13–15. The typical example of a Pareto superior transaction is one that
involves two parties. Id. at 13. Economists assume that the parties agree to an
exchange of resources only if both parties to the transaction think that they will be
better off. See id. at 14. If the transaction involves an agent (i.e., a party acting on
behalf of one of the principals), the risk that the transaction will not be a Pareto
superior transaction increases. The agent may mistakenly enter a transaction
thinking it is one that will benefit the owner, when in reality the owner will be
harmed by the transaction. The transaction would not be Pareto superior because
someone, here one of the principals to the transaction, would be worse off after the
transaction.
56
Id. at 13–15.
57
Id.
58
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS AND BEHAVIORAL
PERSPECTIVES 51 (2002).
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59

Kaldor-Hicks approach is more utilitarian.
It focuses on the net
benefit. Individual autonomy is sacrificed in the interest of overall
societal gain.
4.

Economic Analysis of the Early Common Law
Approach
60

By adopting the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, the common
61
law courts were implicitly adopting a Pareto approach to efficiency.
The courts focused on the individual parties to the transaction and
62
the requirement that each party had to consent. By requiring the
actual owner of the property to consent, as opposed to allowing his or
her agent’s consent to be binding, the law ensured that the
transaction would occur only if both parties agreed that the
63
transaction would make them better off. Any other rule ran the risk
of an agent entering into a transaction on the belief that it would
make an owner better off when in fact it did not. Under the rule of
nemo dat, if an agent entered into a transaction without the owner’s
consent, and if it harmed the owner, the owner could rescind the
64
transaction and recover the property.
Because the owner had the right to rescind the transaction and
recover the property if he or she did not consent to the transaction,
the risk of an agent entering into an unauthorized transaction was
65
placed completely on the buyer. The only way for a buyer to avoid
this risk was to conduct a thorough inquiry into the agent’s authority
to ensure that the owner had consented to the proposed transaction.

59
60

See id. at 59.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule of nemo

dat.
61

The common law rule may not constitute perfect Pareto superiority, but it
generally reflects a Paretian approach. (As John Maynard Keynes opined, “Practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual forces, are
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1936)). The common law courts’
focus on the individual parties to the transaction and the insistence that the owner
had to consent—regardless of the benefits to the purchaser and possibly others—is
more consistent with the Pareto superior requirement that no one can be worse off
after the transaction than it is with the Kaldor-Hicks approach. See POSNER, supra
note 1, at 13–14. The common law courts did not consider the effect of this
approach on third parties; rather, they focused only on the effect of the proposed
transaction on the individual parties to the transaction. See also supra notes 55–59.
62
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 13–14.
63
See supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pareto superior
transactions.
64
See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
65
See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.

980

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:971

The common law broad duty of inquiry followed logically from the
66
Any other rule would have undermined the
rule of nemo dat.
principle of nemo dat and could have resulted in transactions that
were not Pareto superior. As applied to the common law trust, the
67
broad duty of inquiry promoted Paretian efficiency.
B. The Rise of Commercialism and the Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine
1.

The Rise of Commercialism

With the development of the marketplace, where commercial
goods from outside the immediate area were offered for sale, typically
by agents, tension arose between the needs of the marketplace and
68
the common law rule of nemo dat. Third parties wishing to purchase
goods at market needed assurances that they were receiving good
title. Where an agent represented the owner, the risk that the

66

See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule of nemo

dat.
67

An alternative way of assessing the efficiency of the common law approach is to
ask whether it is more efficient to put the risk of loss from a breach of trust on the
third party who deals with the trustee or on the trust beneficiaries—i.e., which party
is the least cost avoider? It is assumed that whichever party bears the risk of loss will
take steps to minimize the risk as long as such steps are efficient. See COLE &
GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 213. If the risk of loss is placed on the third party, the
third party can take steps to reduce the risk of a breach by inquiring into the
trustee’s power to engage in the proposed transaction. If the risk of loss is placed on
the trust beneficiaries, it may be cost prohibitive for them to take steps to reduce the
risk of a breach. Putting the risk of loss on the trust beneficiaries would impose a
duty on them to monitor and supervise the trustee. See supra note 4 and infra notes
191–94. Imposing such a duty on trust beneficiaries is inconsistent with one of the
principal purposes of a common law trust; namely, trusts are used for people who
need protecting (i.e., the elderly, widows, minors, and orphans). See infra note 194
and accompanying text. Such individuals are incapable of monitoring or supervising
their own trustee. Moreover, the ex ante logistical difficulties of attempting to
monitor or supervise an agent are substantial. See Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in
Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225–26 (Eric A.
Posner ed., 2000). Finally, supervising an agent assumes that the supervising party
has control over the agent. At common law, and even today, trust beneficiaries have
no control over a trustee. They have no right to remove a trustee; even a breach of
trust, in and of itself, may not be sufficient grounds. BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 519–
20, 524, 527; 2 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 107 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmts. d & e (2003). Trust beneficiaries have no effective
means of supervising or controlling their trustee. See infra notes 205–19 and
accompanying text.
68
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“But as the marketplace became first regional
and then national, a recurrent situation came to be the misappropriation of goods by
a faithless agent in fraud of his principal. Classic theory required that the principal
be protected and that the risks of agency distribution be cast on the purchaser. The
market demanded otherwise.”).

2005 TRUSTEE’S POWERS AND THIRD PARTY LIABILITY

981

69

transaction might be unauthorized was on the buyer.
For
commercial markets to thrive and grow, third parties who purchased
70
goods at market needed greater protection.
With time, the economic benefits of the marketplace and the
development of commercial goods led to several exceptions to the
traditional common law rule favoring absolute protection of
ownership. Statutorily, legislatures enacted Factor’s Acts, which
provided that where an owner entrusted commercial goods to a
commercial agent, buyers who purchased the goods at market were
protected and received good title even if the agent did not have
71
authority to sell the goods.
Judicially, courts broadened their
construction of what constituted an owner’s consent, thereby
72
permitting one without good title to transfer good title to a buyer.
The effect of these developments was to permit a good faith
purchaser to obtain good title, even if the owner had not expressly
73
authorized the sale in question.

69

Id.; see also Warren, supra note 42, at 470.
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057; Warren, supra note 42, at 469 (quoting from
Blackstone: ‘“[I]t is expedient, that the buyer, by taking proper precautions, may, at
all events be secure of his purchase, otherwise all commerce between man and man
must soon be at an end.’”).
71
For a discussion of Factor’s Acts as the first “significant breach in common law
property theory,” see Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057–58; see also 2 WILLISTON ON
SALES §§ 318, 319 (rev. ed. 1948); Warren, supra note 42, at 471.
72
See Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1059–60; Warren, supra note 42, at 470–72. The
general rule that one without good title could not transfer good title did not apply if
the owner consented to the transfer in question—an agent could transfer good title.
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057; Warren, supra note 42, at 470 n.10. At first this
exception was limited to scenarios where the owner expressly consented to the transfer
in question. Warren, supra note 42, at 470 n.10. Over time, however, the courts began
to infer the owner’s consent, by estopping the owner from denying he or she had
consented, in a variety of situations where the court concluded that the owner was
responsible for the third party’s belief that the party in possession of the property was
authorized to sell the goods: (a) where an owner permitted a party to fraudulently
acquire possession (this led to the well-known distinction between void title and
voidable title—the notion of voidable title further supported the marketability of
goods and further eroded the common law rule favoring absolute ownership of
property), see Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1059–60; (b) where an owner transferred
possession of the property to an agent and expressly authorized the agent to sell the
goods—though not to the particular transferee with whom the agent dealt, Warren,
supra note 42, at 470–72; and (c) where an owner entrusted goods to an agent who
regularly dealt in such goods (this development culminated in Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-403, U.C.C. § 2-403 (1977)). Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057–58; Warren,
supra note 42, at 470–72.
73
The implied intent/estoppel approach developed by the common law courts
ultimately was codified in the Uniform Sales Act and the UCC. See UNIF. SALES ACT
§§ 23, 24 (1977); U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-304(2), 8-302, 8-304(2) (1977).
70
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With the evolution of the marketplace and the increase in
commercial goods, commercial law came to trump the traditional
common law property rule favoring absolute protection of
74
ownership. A party with less than good title could pass good title to a
good faith purchaser. The exception became the norm—at least as
applied to commercial goods. For economic and equitable reasons,
the law shifted from protecting ownership to protecting market
transactions—from protecting owners to protecting third parties who
purchased commercial goods in good faith and for valuable
75
consideration.
2.

Expansion of the Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine

Although the good faith purchaser doctrine originated with the
birth of the modern marketplace and the sale of commercial goods,
over time it took on a life of its own. Armed with the doctrine’s
economic and equitable justifications, courts and legislatures began
to apply the doctrine to virtually all transactions, regardless of the
76
type of property or the representative acting on behalf of the owner.
As long as the owner entrusted the property to an agent, bailee,
employee, or similar party acting on the owner’s behalf, and that
party improperly sold the property to a good faith purchaser, the
economic needs of the capitalistic system and the equities with
respect to the good faith purchaser favored protecting the
77
transferee. The expansion of the good faith purchaser doctrine
74

Warren, supra note 42, at 492.
This change in the law also represents a shift away from a Paretian approach to
more of a Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency. See supra notes 55–59 for a
discussion of these two models. Although some individual property owners may have
been worse off under the exceptions to the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, society as
a whole was better off. The erosion of the common law rule was necessary to permit
and promote market transactions, which led to the rise of commercialism and the
industrial revolution. See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of LaissezFaire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO. ST. L.J. 153, 189
(1995).
76
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1057 (“The triumph of the good faith purchaser has
been one of the most dramatic episodes in our legal history.”).
77
Id. Compared to the common law nemo dat approach, the good faith
purchaser doctrine shifts much of the risk of a wrongful transfer of property from
the buyer to the owner. (As long as the buyer acts in good faith, even if the agent
improperly transfers the property, the buyer is protected. The owner will bear the
risk of loss.) This creates an incentive for owners to be more careful in selecting the
party who is going to act on their behalf. See infra notes 206–09. Generally, as long
as the party purporting to transfer the property has the express power to sell, the
implied authority to sell, or the apparent authorization to sell, the good faith
purchaser takes good title. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. The
growth of the good faith purchaser doctrine shows increasing acceptance by the
75
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beyond commercial goods further eroded the traditional common
law rule favoring absolute protection of ownership.
3.

The Law of Trusts Distinguished

The economic pressures and equitable arguments that led to the
change in the law with respect to commercial goods did not apply to
the law of trusts. The typical common law trust was funded with real
78
property, not commercial goods.
The typical purpose of the
79
common law trust was to preserve the trust property. Transfers of
trust property to third parties were to be discouraged, not
80
encouraged.
The common law courts continued to apply the
traditional common law rule favoring absolute protection of the
owner—the trust beneficiaries. The courts continued to impose a
broad duty of inquiry on a third party interested in dealing with a
trustee, requiring the third party to determine the trustee’s authority
to transfer the property and whether the transfer constituted a
81
breach of trust. A third party who dealt with a trustee continued to
82
do so at his or her own risk.
In addition, although in theory the expanded good faith
purchaser doctrine applied to a third party who dealt with a trustee,
in practice the doctrine added little protection.
The courts
distinguished trustees from other parties acting on behalf of an
83
owner. Agents, bailees, and similar parties acting on behalf of an
owner were deemed to have certain inherent or apparent powers
84
over the property in their possession and control. Because of these

courts of the Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency. See infra notes 94–97 and
accompanying text.
78
See William F. Fratcher, Trustees’ Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 631–
32, 657–58 (1962); Langbein, supra note 28, at 632.
79
BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the
Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1336 (2003); Langbein, supra note 28, at 633,
640.
80
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 79, at 1336; see also Fratcher, supra note 78,
at 658 (“With such trusts [early common law trusts], narrow construction of express
powers and reluctance to find implied powers were beneficial to the primogenitary
heir and ordinarily reflected the true intention of the settlor.”); Langbein, supra note
28, at 640 (“Stakeholder trustees did not need to transact.”).
81
See Langbein, supra note 28, at 640–42.
82
Inasmuch as the typical common law trust was funded with real property, and
the purpose of the trust was to preserve the real property for future beneficiaries, the
chilling effect created by the common law rule of strict liability for third parties who
participated in a breach of trust was consistent with the nature and served the
purpose of the common law trust. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
83
BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 11–15.
84
2A C.J.S. Agency §§ 128–45, 386 (1997).
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inherent or apparent powers, a third party who dealt with them was
free to assume that the party acting on behalf of the owner had the
85
power to transfer the property in question.
In contrast, historically a trustee had no inherent powers over
86
the trust property, but only those powers expressly granted by the
settlor or those powers necessarily implied in light of the trust’s
87
purpose. Once a third party knew or should have known that he or
she was dealing with a trustee, the third party was charged with
knowledge of the default rule that the trustee had no inherent
powers and was not authorized to transfer the trust property absent
88
express or implied authorization. For all practical purposes, the
third party was charged with the presumption that the proposed
transaction constituted a breach of trust, absent express
authorization. A third party interested in dealing with a trustee had
to inquire diligently into the express terms of the trust to confirm
that the trustee was authorized to engage in the proposed
89
transaction. If the third party failed to inquire, it was charged with
90
knowledge of the scope of the trustee’s powers. Third parties were
91
also charged with proper construction of the trust’s terms. The
good faith purchaser doctrine had no meaningful application to a
third party who knew or should have known that it was dealing with a
92
trustee. If a third party participated in a transaction with a trustee
and the transaction constituted a breach of trust, for all practical
93
purposes, the third party was strictly liable.
4.

Economic Analysis of the Rise of Commercialism and
the Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine

The evolution of commercial law and the expansion of the good
faith purchaser doctrine reflect a shift in the thinking of the common
law courts. Instead of focusing only on the parties to the transaction
85

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1959); see also Langbein, supra note
28, at 627.
87
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
186).
88
Id. at 645.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Langbein, supra note 28, at 641 (stating that “trust law purported to protect the
bona fide purchaser of trust assets, but as a practical matter made it ‘very difficult to
qualify as a bona fide purchaser’” (quoting William F. Fratcher, Trust, in 6
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 98, at 80 (1973))).
93
4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 297.4 (4th ed. 1989).
86
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(the more Paretian approach), the economic benefits of the
marketplace convinced the courts to shift to the Kaldor-Hicks
approach, with its emphasis on the net benefit to society—the more
94
utilitarian approach.
With the development of markets in
commercial goods, there were substantial economic benefits to be
gained from assuming that an owner authorized the proposed
transaction and from protecting a good faith purchaser even if the
seller did not have good title. As applied to commercial goods, the
courts concluded the economic benefits generated by changing the
law were sufficient to compensate owners of property who were
harmed as a result of the change. From a Kaldor-Hicks perspective,
the rise of commercial law and the expansion of the good faith
95
purchaser rule were efficient.
Even from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, however, it was not
efficient to apply such rules to the common law trust. Commercial
goods, by their nature, are intended to be transferred. The
overwhelming majority of owners of commercial goods intends that
the goods be transferable and prefers the rules concerning transfers
of such property be broadened to facilitate such transfers and to
encourage the growth of commercial markets. Promoting such
transfers generated substantial benefits which justified abandoning
the common law approach. Common law trusts, on the other hand,
96
were intended to preserve trust property. Most common law settlors
did not want their trustees to have broad powers over the trust
property. Granting trustees greater powers would likely lead to more
breaches of trust, not to substantial benefits. The common law
courts’ decision to keep a trustee’s powers limited to those expressly
granted by the settlor and to continue imposing the broad duty of
97
inquiry made economic sense, even from a Kaldor-Hicks approach.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN TRUST
With the evolution of the modern trust, however, the common
law approach to the law of trusts became increasingly cumbersome
and expensive. The world changed from a land-based economy to a
mercantile economy. The principal form of wealth changed from
real property to personal property, such as stocks, bonds, certificates
94

See HARRISON, supra note 58, at 59.
See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of what constitutes efficiency.
96
BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 79, at 1336;
Langbein, supra note 28, at 633, 640.
97
See infra Part V.B for a more detailed economic analysis of the efficiency of the
broad duty of inquiry as applied to the common law trust.
95
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of deposits, annuities, savings accounts, and the like. The primary
99
method of funding trusts likewise changed. The purpose of the
modern trust changed from preserving the trust property (real
property) to managing the trust property (a fund of intangible
100
wealth).
Proper management of the modern trust implicitly
necessitates broad powers over the trust property, liberal
authorization to invest the trust fund, and the ability to shift
101
investments quickly as market conditions change. The trustee of a
modern trust needs, and wants, to be a player in the marketplace.
The nature and purpose of the modern trust were at odds with the
common law trust rules.
A. The Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act
It was against this historical background that Professor Fratcher,
102
one of the preeminent wills and trusts scholars of his time, called
for enhanced trustee’s powers and investment authority to facilitate
103
trust administration. Professor Fratcher proposed that each trustee
have, by virtue of his or her appointment, the “power to do whatever
a prudent man would do in the management of his own property for
104
the trust purposes.”
Professor Fratcher also recognized that these enhanced powers
would be meaningless without enhanced protection for a third party
who dealt with a trustee. The “great barrier” to trust administration
was not so much a trustee’s lack of power, but rather a third party’s
98

Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658; see also Langbein, supra note 28, at 638.
Langbein, supra note 28, at 638 (“The modern trust typically holds a portfolio
of these complex financial assets . . . . This portfolio requires active and specialized
management, in contrast to the conveyancing trust that merely held ancestral
land.”).
100
Id.; see also id. at 637. Professor Langbein calls the modern trend “the
management trust.” Id.
101
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658 (“He [the modern settlor] ordinarily intends
that the trustee shall have all powers needed for efficient and economical
management with a view to production of adequate income and enhancement of the
principal for the benefit of the cestuis que trust.”).
102
Professor Fratcher had a hand in drafting the Uniform Probate Code, and his
article on trustees’ powers legislation served as the blueprint for the Uniform
Trustees’ Powers Act. The Missouri Law Review paid tribute to Professor Fratcher
and lauded his contributions to the field of wills and trusts upon his retirement from
the faculty. Dedication to William F. Fratcher, 48 MO. L. REV. 313, 313–24 (1983).
103
Professor Fratcher’s article highlights the limitations and deficiencies of the
common law approach to trustees’ powers and trust investments, and shows how illsuited the common law rules had become to the modern trust. See Fratcher, supra
note 78, at 629–57. Professor Fratcher’s frustration with the common law approach
to the law of trusts is evident from the opening paragraph of his article. See id. at 627.
104
Id. at 660.
99
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trepidation because of the common law broad duty of inquiry and its
105
strict liability for a third party who participated in a breach of trust.
Professor Fratcher called for: (1) abolition of the common law broad
duty of inquiry, and (2) adoption of an actual knowledge standard of
106
liability for a third party who participates in a breach of trust.
Professor Fratcher’s article served as the blueprint for the
107
Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (“UTPA”).
The UTPA grants each
trustee enhanced powers, including all the powers a prudent person
108
would need to manage his or her own property. The UTPA rejects
109
the common law broad duty to inquire.
Instead, it grants a third
party who deals with a trustee complete protection from liability
unless the third party has actual knowledge, at the time of the
transaction, that the proposed transaction constitutes a breach of
110
trust. The official reporter for the UTPA acknowledged the broad
protection the UTPA accorded third parties who dealt with a trustee:
It is to be noted that constructive knowledge, as distinguished
from actual knowledge, is not enough. Therefore, mere suspicion
that limitations exist or knowledge of facts which, if pursued,
would show that limitations exist do not deprive a person of this
protection. . . . The remedy for breach is limited to the trustee
and a third party with actual knowledge that the trustee is
exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them. Therefore,
more than ever, it is important that the trustee be carefully
111
selected, bonded, or otherwise a person of fiscal responsibility.
105

Id. at 662.
Id. at 662–63. Professor Fratcher opined:
Might it not be better to eliminate the duty of inquiry in all
transactions with trustees and make third parties who engage or assist
in such transactions liable to the cestui que trust only when they have
actual knowledge that the trustee is committing a breach of trust? The
duty of inquiry is rarely of real value to the cestui, yet it impedes the
effective administration of every trust by delaying necessary
transactions and discouraging dealings with and assistance to trustees.
Id. Professor Fratcher offered no additional support or explanation for the “no duty
of inquiry/actual knowledge” standard of liability.
107
See UTPA, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 388, 389; see also Charles Horowitz,
Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1966).
108
UTPA § 2(a), 7C U.L.A. 398 (“The trustee has all powers conferred upon him
by the provisions of this Act unless limited in the trust instrument . . . .”).
109
Id. § 7, 7C U.L.A. 431 (“The third person is not bound to inquire whether the
trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the power . . . .”).
110
Id. (“[A] third person, without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding
his powers or improperly exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the
trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to
exercise.”).
111
Horowitz, supra note 107, at 28–29. Neither the official comments nor the
reporter’s comments to the UTPA offer any further discussion or explanation of the
106
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B. The Uniform Trust Code
In 2000, the Uniform Law Commission appointed a committee
112
to draft a new “comprehensive” uniform law dealing with the law of
trusts: the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”). Like the UTPA, the UTC
adopts the modern approach to the law of trusts. The UTC grants a
113
trustee broad powers over the trust property and endorses liberal
114
investment authority. Like the UTPA, the UTC recognizes that for
these enhanced powers to be effective, third parties who deal with a
trustee need more protection than they were accorded at common
law. Like the UTPA, the UTC completely eliminates the common law
broad duty of inquiry just because a third party knows or should know
115
that he or she is dealing with a trustee. In the event the transaction
constitutes a breach of trust, however, the UTC protects the third
party from liability only if the third party acted in good faith and gave
116
valuable consideration.
C. Economic Analysis of the Uniform Law Approach to the Scope of a
Trustee’s Powers
While the common law trust rules concerning a trustee’s powers
and investment authority were ill-suited to the modern trust, the
common law rules were not inherently incompatible with the nature
and objectives of the modern trust. The common law rule that a

unusually broad protection given to a third party who deals with a trustee under the
UTPA.
112
See UTC, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 144–48 (Supp. 2004).
113
See id. §§ 815–16, 7C U.L.A. 244–46. Changes between the adoption of the
UTPA and the UTC make the UTC’s provision granting broad powers to each trustee
even more defensible. Increasingly, the trust is being used for commercial purposes.
See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,
107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997). The typical commercial trust settlor intends for the trustee
to have broad powers over the trust property to facilitate its commercial purpose.
The UTC also provides that a settlor cannot opt out of the broad protection
accorded third parties. See UTC § 105(b)(11), 7C U.L.A. 160 (referencing section
1012, which provides protection for third parties dealing with a trustee).
114
See UTC, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 2004) (encouraging states to
enact, reenact, or codify the Uniform Prudent Investor Act as Article 9 of the UTC).
115
Id. § 1012(b), 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004) (“A person other than a beneficiary
who in good faith deals with a trustee is not required to inquire into the extent of the
trustee’s powers or the propriety of their exercise.”).
116
Id. § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004) (“A person other than a beneficiary
who in good faith assists a trustee, or who in good faith and for value deals with a
trustee, without knowledge that the trustee is exceeding or improperly exercising the
trustee’s powers is protected from liability as if the trustee properly exercised the
power.”).
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117

trustee had no inherent powers was a default rule.
A settlor was
free to grant the trustee expressly any and all powers that the settlor
118
wished.
In addition, although the common law default rule was
119
that the trustee had limited investment discretion, a settlor was free
120
to grant the trustee expressly broader investment authority.
By
expressly granting a trustee enhanced powers over the trust property
and broad investment authority, the modern trust could fit within the
121
common law trust rules—but only at increased costs.
By adopting the default rule that a trustee had no inherent
powers and limited investment authority, but permitting a settlor to
opt out of such a regime, the common law took a Pareto
superior/personal autonomy approach to the issue of a trustee’s
122
powers and investment authority.
If a settlor, acting individually,
determined that his or her trustee would be better off with broader
powers and/or greater investment authority, the settlor could incur
the added costs of expressly granting the trustee those powers and/or
that authority. The settlor (and his or her trust) would be better off,
and no one else would be worse off. Moreover, over time, as more
and more settlors opted for broader powers and investment
authority, the law changed to make it easier for them to do so. States
adopted broad statutory lists of powers which drafters could
123
incorporate into trust instruments, thereby minimizing the costs
associated with opting out of the common law default rule.
The UTPA and the UTC, however, automatically grant each
trustee all the powers necessary to perform “every act which a
124
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust . . . .” In
analyzing the economic merits of automatically granting a trustee
broad powers over the trust property and liberal investment
authority, it is important to note the bifurcated approach the UTPA
and the UTC adopt. The uniform laws split the issue of the scope of
a trustee’s powers depending on whether one is inquiring about (1)
117

Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
186); see also supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
118
See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627.
119
See id. at 634–35.
120
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186.
121
See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658–59 (pointing out that attorneys drafting
modern trust instruments were forced to include page after page of express powers
and broad investment provisions that the drafter anticipated the trustee might need
to carry out the objectives of the modern trust).
122
See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of efficiency.
123
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 627–29.
124
UTPA § 3(a), 7C U.L.A. 401; see also UTC §§ 815–16, 7C U.L.A. 244–46 (Supp.
2004).
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the relationship between the trustee and the trust beneficiaries, or
(2) the relationship between the trustee and a third party interested
in dealing with the trustee.
1.

Scope of Trustee’s Powers as Between the Trustee and
the Trust Beneficiaries

As applied to the relationship between the trustee and the trust
beneficiaries, the uniform laws change the default rule from a trustee
has no inherent powers to a trustee has all the powers a prudent
125
person would need to manage the trust.
But the uniform laws
permit each settlor to opt out of this approach if the settlor desires,
126
thereby retaining settlor autonomy —to a degree. In so doing, the
uniform laws maintain a Pareto superior approach regarding the
scope of a trustee’s powers between the trustee and the trust
beneficiaries.
From an economic perspective, the first issue is whether the
change in the default rule with respect to the scope of the trustee’s
powers as between the trustee and the trust beneficiaries will result in
any savings. To the extent that neither default rule will please all
settlors, the analysis turns on which approach a majority of settlors
would prefer, and which approach would incur greater drafting costs
127
for those settlors who decide to opt out of the default rule.
Inasmuch as the drafting costs of opting out of either default
approach are arguably the same, the key is which approach is favored
by more settlors. Professor Fratcher argued, and the drafters of the
UTPA and UTC apparently agreed, that the modern settlor prefers
that his or her trustee have greater powers over the trust property.
Although Professor Fratcher provided no statistical evidence to
128
support his assertion, it appears to be widely accepted; this favors
adopting the uniform law approach as to the scope of the trustee’s
129
powers.
125

UTPA § 3(a), 7C U.L.A. 401.
See Horowitz, supra note 107, at 12; see also supra notes 89–90, 117–23.
127
Under the common law’s no inherent powers approach, a settlor who wants his
or her trustee to have enhanced powers over the trust property can put such powers
expressly into the trust instrument. While Professor Fratcher emphasized the
challenges drafters faced in drafting such trust provisions, all a settlor needs to do is
expressly adopt the language set forth in the UTPA. See Fratcher, supra note 78, at
627, 654–55. Under the modern rule advocated by Professor Fratcher, there will be
settlors who will not want their trustee to have such enhanced powers. These settlors
will face similar challenges and costs in drafting around the modern default rule.
128
See id. at 658.
129
Professor Fratcher also argued that the default rule needed to be changed
because courts consistently refused to give full effect to a settlor’s attempt at opting
126
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Even if one assumes that the majority of modern settlors would
prefer the modern approach, however, the magnitude of the savings
associated with the change in the default rule is not significant. It is
only when one includes the change in the scope of the trustee’s
powers between the trustee and a third party that the savings
associated with the change in the scope of a trustee’s powers become
significant. This is because that change directly affects a third party’s
duty to inquire. Although Professor Fratcher and the drafters of the
UTC gave only cursory treatment to the third party’s duty to inquire,
from an economic perspective that is a key provision, if not the key
130
provision, of modern trust law.
2.

Scope of a Trustee’s Powers as Between the Trustee
and a Third Party

With respect to the scope of a trustee’s powers between the
trustee and a third party, the UTPA and the UTC grant each trustee

out of the common law default rule. See id. at 629 n.11, 634–35, 637–39, 657–58 &
660. There is the risk of litigation, however, over an individual’s intent anytime a
party attempts to opt out of a default rule. Professor Fratcher failed to expressly
assert or prove that there was anything special about the common law default rule
which made the costs of litigation associated with it any greater than one would
expect under the UTPA default approach. But see infra notes 193, 220 & 227 for a
discussion of Professor Alexander’s argument that there is something special about
the courts’ interpretation of settlors’ attempts to opt out of the common law rule.
130
Even where a settlor expressly granted his or her trustee broad powers and
liberal investment authority, a third party wishing to deal with the trustee was obliged
to start with the assumption that the trustee had no such powers, and had to
undertake the broad common law duty to inquire. See Fratcher, supra note 78, at
662–63. The duty remained a burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive obstacle
for third parties who wished to deal with a trustee. Id. Trustees were unable to
consummate transactions quickly because third parties were required to stop and
inquire into the express terms of the trust to determine if the transaction was
authorized. Id. at 663. Such delays increased the transaction costs of doing business
with a trustee. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act (“UFA”) and the UCC provided some
relief with respect to the problem of trying to fit the modern trust into the common
law rules. As to transactions that come within their scope, third parties are absolved
of the common law broad duty to inquire. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (1977); U.F.A.
§§ 4, 6–9 (1990); Peter T. Wendel, Examining the Mystery Behind the Unusually and
Inexplicably Broad Provisions of Section Seven of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act: A Call for
Clarification, 56 MO. L. REV. 25, 26–27, 59 (1991). Third parties are entitled to
presume that the transaction is authorized unless there are facts present that would
cause a reasonable person to think otherwise. See id at 60. The scope of the uniform
acts, however, is limited to those commercial instruments the market for which
necessitates that the parties be able to deal with each other quickly and with minimal
investigation into whether they are authorized to engage in such transactions. To
the extent economic pressure was building to revise the law of trusts, this pressure
stemmed more from the common law broad duty of inquiry than it did from the
trustee’s lack of inherent powers.
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all the powers a prudent man would need to manage the trust, and
132
a settlor is not permitted to opt out of this rule. In adopting such an
approach, the uniform laws reject the common law Pareto
superior/personal autonomy approach in favor of the Kaldor-Hick’s
approach. No doubt, there are, and will be, settlors who would prefer
that their trustee not have the broad powers granted under the
uniform law approach—settlors who believe that the enhanced
powers put the trust property and settlor’s intent at greater risk. But
these settlors have no option vis-à-vis third parties. As applied to
these settlors, the uniform law approach is not efficient from a Pareto
superior perspective. Whether the uniform law approach is efficient
under the Kaldor-Hicks approach depends on whether the savings of
inherently granting each trustee such broad powers exceed the harm.
In assessing this issue, the analysis must address the third party’s
duty to inquire. If a settlor were permitted to opt out of the rule
regarding the scope of the trustee’s powers, third parties would have
to inquire as to the scope of each trustee’s powers before dealing with
133
that trustee. For all practical purposes the common law broad duty
of inquiry, with all of its inherent costs, would still apply. As long as a
settlor is not permitted to opt out of the modern uniform law
approach, third parties can assume that the trustee has the right to
engage in the proposed transaction—thereby abolishing the broad
duty to inquire just because one knows or should know that he or she
is dealing with a trustee. While there are obvious savings associated
with eliminating the common law broad duty of inquiry, the question
is whether eliminating the duty improves efficiency. Eliminating the
broad duty of inquiry will increase the potential for a breach of trust.
Whether eliminating the duty improves efficiency requires a more
131

UTPA § 2(a), 7C U.L.A. 398; see also UTC §§ 815–16, 7C U.L.A. 244–46 (Supp.
2004).
132
Horowitz, supra note 107, at 28–29; see also UTC § 105(b)(11), 7C U.L.A. 160
(Supp. 2004). Expressly requiring each and every trustee to have such powers
constitutes a fundamental change in trust law. Historically, the essence of the trust
has been the particular settlor’s intent; each trust is unique. The settlor’s intent
controls the extent of each beneficiary’s interest in the trust, the scope of the
trustee’s fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, and the ability of a third party to deal
with the trustee; personal autonomy ruled. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§
128, 164 & 186 (1959); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1; 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
27, §§ 1–2 (4th ed. 1987). Under the UTPA’s approach to trustee’s powers, the
individual settlor’s intent is replaced by a generic trustee’s intent with respect to a
third party’s dealing with the trustee. Individualized settlor’s intent is sacrificed in
the interest of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks approach.
133
Only by inquiring into the scope of the trustee’s powers could the third party
tell if the settlor had opted out of the default rule.
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detailed analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the
common law broad duty of inquiry.
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY OF INQUIRY
A. Economic Primer on Expected Costs of Harm and Efficiency
Economists assume that harm is generally bad and should be
minimized if it can be done so efficiently. If a breach of trust were to
occur, it would cause harm. The expected harm of a breach of trust
is a function of the monetary cost of a breach, if it were to occur,
134
discounted by the probability of a breach occurring:
Expected Cost of Breach = Cost of Breach × Probability of Breach

The probability of a breach of trust corresponds directly to the level
of precautions taken to minimize the risk: the greater the level of
precautions, the lower the probability of a breach; the lower the level
135
of precautions, the greater the probability of a breach. The level of
precautions, and who takes them, in turn is a function of the
136
standard of liability the law imposes on the parties involved.
137
In determining the
Precautions, however, are added costs.
total social costs associated with a risk, the analysis must include the
costs of the precautions taken by the parties to minimize the
138
probability of a breach. From an economic perspective, the goal is
to minimize the total expected social costs associated with the risk of a
139
breach of trust; that is, to minimize (1) the expected cost of a
breach, if it were to occur, and (2) the costs of the precautions taken
140
to minimize the probability of a breach occurring:
134

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300.
From an economic perspective, it is not efficient to eliminate completely the
probability of a breach because at some point the added marginal cost incurred in
reducing the probability of a breach will exceed the added marginal benefit gained
by doing so. At that point it is inefficient to continue to take precautions to try to
minimize the probability of a breach. Id. at 301–02.
136
Laws create incentives for parties to behave in a particular manner, and
standards of liability create incentives for parties to take precautions to minimize the
risk of harm. If a standard of liability places the risk of loss on a particular party, it
creates an incentive for that party to take precautions to minimize that risk.
Different standards of liability create different incentives with respect to both which
party or parties will take precautions and the level of precautions taken. Id. at 302–
11.
137
Id. at 300 (“Taking precaution often involves the loss of money, time, or
convenience.”).
138
Id. at 300–01.
139
Id. at 301.
140
This formula constitutes a rather simplified model of the total possible social
costs associated with a breach of trust. There are other factors that could be
135
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Total Expected Social Costs =
(Cost of Breach × Probability of Breach) + Cost of Precautions

Efficiency is promoted when the total expected social costs are
reduced.
Holding a third party liable for participating in a breach of trust
creates an incentive for taking added precautions against a breach. If
141
a breach of trust occurs, the trustee is liable. The trustee’s liability
creates an incentive for a trustee not to commit a breach of trust.
From an economic perspective, the issue is whether it is worthwhile
to also hold liable the third party who participated in the breach—
i.e., whether the added costs inherent in the standard of third party
liability so reduce the probability of a breach that it produces a net
reduction in the total expected social costs associated with a breach
of trust. That question requires a detailed analysis of (1) the assumed
magnitude of the cost of a breach of trust if it were to occur; (2) the
assumed magnitude of the change in the probability of a breach of
trust with and without the standard of liability; and (3) the assumed
magnitude of the costs of the precautions associated with the
standard of liability.
B. Economic Analysis of the Broad Duty to Inquire as Applied to the
Common Law Trust
The common law imposed a broad duty of inquiry on a third
party who knew or should have known that he or she was dealing with
142
a trustee. Moreover, the common law charged the third party with
143
proper construction of the trust instrument.
For all practical
purposes, a third party who dealt with a trustee was strictly liable if
144
the transaction turned out to constitute a breach of trust.
This
strict liability approach placed the risk of loss associated with a breach
145
Placing all of the cost of harm on the
of trust on the third party.

included in a more complex economic model, including how the standard of liability
affects the level of activity in question and the administrative costs inherent in the
standard of liability. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 311–13, 320–23. For a detailed
discussion of administrative costs, see infra note 158 and accompanying text; Parts
VI.A.3 & VI.B.
141
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
143
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
144
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
145
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 303. As applied to the risk that a breach of
trust will occur, this assumes that the third party cannot recover from the trustee. If
the third party can recover from the trustee, the effect of the strict liability standard
is to shift the administrative costs associated with the recovery from the trust
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third party created an incentive for third parties to engage in a broad
inquiry into the trustee’s powers and authority to engage in the
proposed transaction in order to minimize the risk of loss associated
146
with a potential breach of trust.
While the costs inherent in the
broad duty of inquiry were not insignificant at common law,
imposing this duty on third parties was nevertheless efficient because
it reduced the total, social expected costs associated with a breach of
trust.
First, under the common law assumptions and conditions, the
total cost of the precautions—the costs inherent in the broad duty of
inquiry—was assumed to be relatively low. The common law norm
was for personal transactions conducted face-to-face between a buyer
147
and seller who typically knew each other. Requiring third parties to
inquire into the trustee’s powers under such circumstances imposed
relatively minimal costs. In addition, common law courts assumed
that the duty of inquiry would not arise that often. Trustees were not
supposed to transact with third parties very often. The purpose of
148
the common law trust was to preserve the trust property. Hence the
total cost of the common law broad duty of inquiry was assumed to be
relatively low.
On the other hand, at common law the savings associated with
the broad duty of inquiry were substantial. First, the cost of a breach
of trust, if it were to occur, was assumed to be significant. The
common law trust typically was funded with a family’s ancestral
149
lands.
If a breach of trust were to occur, it would presumably
involve the whole trust asset. The costs associated with such a breach
150
would be substantial. In addition, the common law assumed a high
probability that a proposed transaction by a trustee would constitute a
breach of trust. A trustee was not supposed to be engaging in
151
transactions involving the trust property.
Because the assumed cost of a breach of trust was substantial,
and the probability that a proposed transaction with a trustee
constituted a breach of trust was high, it is easy to see why the
beneficiaries to the third party. This latter scenario greatly reduces the magnitude of
the risk/cost being imposed on the third party.
146
Id.
147
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
148
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
149
See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 657–58; see also BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1.
150
Moreover, because the typical common law trustee was an individual, there was
a greater risk that the trustee would be judgment proof. See infra notes 166–68 and
accompanying text.
151
See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
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common law courts concluded that the savings associated with the
broad duty of inquiry more than offset its costs. Even a relatively
small change in the probability of a breach would result in a
substantial savings in the expected cost of a breach. The common law
courts assumed, intuitively, that imposing the common law broad
duty of inquiry would significantly reduce the probability of a breach.
Under the common law conditions, the savings gained from the
reduction in the total expected social cost of a breach of trust
exceeded the costs inherent in the broad duty of inquiry.
Under common law assumptions, the common law broad duty of
152
inquiry and its chilling effect upon third parties interested in
dealing with a trustee promoted efficiency by reducing the
153
The broad
probability of a breach of trust at a relatively low cost.
duty of inquiry served its purpose well as applied to the common law
trust.
C. Economic Analysis of the Broad Duty to Inquire as Applied to the
Modern Trust
Although the broad duty of inquiry was efficient as applied to
the common law trust, it is inefficient as applied to the modern trust.
Again, the efficiency of a standard of liability turns on the cost of
precautions incurred under the standard as compared to the savings
generated by the reduction in the probability of a breach occurring.
1.

The Cost of the Broad Duty of Inquiry Under the
Modern Trust

Under modern trust conditions, the costs associated with the
common law broad duty to inquire increase substantially because of
(1) changes in the parties involved in the transaction, and (2)
changes in the nature of the property typically involved in the
transaction. At common law the norm was face-to-face transactions
154
between parties who typically already knew each other.
Inquiring
into the scope of a trustee’s powers under such circumstances was
relatively simple. The modern trust transaction, on the other hand,
152

Professor Fratcher went so far as to call the broad duty of inquiry “the great
barrier” to third parties dealing with a trustee. Fratcher, supra note 78, at 662. The
extent to which a standard of liability affects the underlying level of activity can affect
the economic analysis as well. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 312. As applied
to the common law trust, reducing the number of transactions with the trustee
increased efficiency and furthered the settlor’s intent by helping to preserve the trust
property.
153
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
154
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

2005 TRUSTEE’S POWERS AND THIRD PARTY LIABILITY

997

presumes that the parties have never met and may be thousands of
miles apart. Inquiring into the scope of a trustee’s powers under
such circumstances is more difficult—and more expensive. In
addition, under the common law conditions, the typical trust asset
155
was real property.
Rarely do transactions involving real property
have to be consummated quickly. The time inherent in the inquiry,
in and of itself, did not add costs to the transaction. In contrast, the
typical modern trust asset is usually some form of intangible property
156
interest—stocks, commercial paper, etc. Transactions involving
157
Delays can result in
such assets need to be consummated quickly.
added administrative costs, and increased costs due to lost
158
opportunities and changes in value.
For all of these reasons, the
cost of imposing the common law broad duty to inquire is
significantly higher under modern trust conditions.
In addition, there has been a substantial increase in the
frequency with which the duty to inquire arises. The nature and
purpose of the modern trust—the management of the fund of assets—
assumes that a trustee will participate in the marketplace on a regular
159
basis.
Compared to the common law trust, the number of
transactions between a modern trustee and third parties has
increased exponentially. Yet under the common law broad duty of
inquiry, each time a third party is interested in dealing with a trustee,
the third party would have to engage in an extensive, time
consuming, and expensive inquiry into the scope of the trustee’s
powers and the terms of the trust to determine if the transaction is
160
proper. The total cost of the broad duty of inquiry is substantially
greater as applied to the modern trust.
In light of the nature and purpose of the modern trust,
Professor Fratcher’s assertion, that the common law broad duty of
155

See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 657–58; see also BOGERT, supra note 27, § 1.
Langbein, supra note 28, at 638.
157
See Fatima Akadaff, Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with
Islamic Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“Commercial and financial
transactions by their nature require flexibility, rapidity, and evolution . . . .”); see also
Janine S. Hiller & Don Lloyd Cook, From Clipper Ships to Clipper Chips: The Evolution of
Payment Systems for Electronic Commerce, 17 J.L. & COM. 53, 53 (1997).
158
See Akadaff, supra note 157, at 22.
159
Langbein, supra note 28, at 641 (“The need for active administration of the
modern trust portfolio of financial assets rendered obsolete this [the common law]
scheme of disempowering the trustee to transact with the trust property. The
modern trustee conducts a program of investing and managing the assets that
requires extensive discretion to respond to changing market forces.”); see also
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 658–59.
160
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 664.
156
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inquiry “impedes the effective administration of every trust by
delaying transactions and discouraging dealings with and assistance
161
to trustees,” is defensible.
But what Professor Fratcher failed to
analyze was whether there are benefits derived from the reduction in
the expected cost of a breach of trust which offset the increased costs
under modern trust conditions.
2.

The Benefit of the Broad Duty of Inquiry as Applied to
the Modern Trust

Not only have the costs associated with the common law broad
duty of inquiry increased significantly under modern trust conditions,
the benefits associated with the duty have decreased substantially.
Under the common law conditions, even a relatively small reduction
in the probability of a breach generated substantial savings because
162
the common law assumed that the cost of a breach was high.
Under modern trust conditions and assumptions, however, (1) the
assumed cost of a breach is significantly lower, and (2) the reduction
in the probability of a breach because of the duty of inquiry is
significantly lower.
The assumed cost of a breach is lower because of the nature of
the modern trust res. Instead of the trust holding one asset, the
family ancestral lands, the norm is for the trust to hold a diversified
163
portfolio of assets. Even if a proposed transaction involving one of
those assets constitutes a breach of trust, the percentage of the trust
property at risk is much lower than under the common law
conditions. Thus the assumed cost of a breach under modern trust
164
conditions is substantially lower then it was at common law.
Moreover, under the modern trust conditions and assumptions,
the probability that a proposed transaction constitutes a breach has
161

Id. at 663. As Professor Fratcher, and before him, Professor Scott, argued so
well, as applied to the modern trust, the broad common law duty of inquiry is
overprotective of trust beneficiaries and unduly hinders and increases the costs of
third parties who deal with a trustee. See Austin Wakeman Scott, Participation in a
Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REV. 454, 481 (1921). In addition, strict liability would
reduce a third party’s willingness to transact with a trustee, further increasing the
inefficiency of applying the common law broad duty of inquiry to the modern trust.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 312; see also supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
162
See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
163
Langbein, supra note 28, at 638.
164
Moreover, the cost of a breach must factor in the risk that the trust
beneficiaries cannot achieve full recovery. The risk that the trust beneficiaries will
not be able to achieve full recovery from the trustee is much smaller under modern
trust conditions because of the evolution of the corporate trustee with “deeper
pockets.” See supra note 150 and infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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decreased. Under modern trust conditions, there is an inherently
lower probability that a trustee will engage in a breach of trust—even
without a duty to inquire. Because the purpose of the modern trust is
to manage a fund of assets, it is far more likely that a settlor has
165
authorized the proposed transaction. In addition, the evolution of
the modern trust has been accompanied by the evolution of the
166
167
professional trustee, often a corporate trustee.
The professional
trustee reduces the risk of an inadvertent breach of trust because the
professional trustee has more knowledge of, expertise in, and an
168
overall better understanding of, the trust administration process.
The professional trustee also reduces the risk of an intentional breach
of trust because the professional trustee is typically a corporate
169
trustee subject to multiple layers of supervision and auditing.
Under modern trust conditions, the probability of a breach of trust,
even without a duty to inquire, is substantially lower than under
common law conditions. Because the probability of a breach of trust
is substantially lower even without a duty of inquiry, the added
reduction in the probability of a breach as a result of imposing a

165

See supra notes 102–06, 131–33 and accompanying text.
Langbein, supra note 28, at 638 (“Connected to the change in the nature of
trust assets from realty to financial assets, and in the function of trusteeship from
stakeholding to management, has come a change in the identity of trustees. Trustees
of old were unpaid amateurs, that is, family and community statesmen who lent their
names and their honor to a conveyancing dodge . . . . Private trustees still abound,
but the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid professional, whose business is to
enter into and carry out trust agreements.”).
The evolution of the corporate trustee also reduces the cost of a breach. If a
professional trustee were to engage in a breach of trust, such a trustee typically has
deeper pockets, ensuring that the trust beneficiaries will be able to recover full
damages from the trustee without needing to sue the third party. See id. at 639. But
the prevalence of the corporate trustee is unclear. There are no statistics indicating
how widely it is used. While it is the norm for the commercial trust, anecdotal
evidence indicates that its use for more traditional private trusts appears to be more
common on the east coast than the west coast. In addition, the use of the corporate
trustee has its own costs—the corporate trustee’s fees and possibly the costs of legal
counsel and requiring the trustee to post bond. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note
79, at 1303, 1337–38; Fratcher, supra note 78, at 662–63.
167
Langbein, supra note 28, at 638 (“In the United States these institutional
trustees are commonly corporate fiduciaries . . . .”); see also id. at 640.
168
Id. at 638 (stating that “the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid
professional . . . . These entities thrive on their expertise in investment management,
trust accounting, taxation, regulation, and fiduciary administration”).
169
The individual trust officer in charge of a particular trust must account for his
management of the trust to his supervisors on a regular basis. VICTOR P. WHITNEY,
TRUST DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS §§ 3.07[5], 4.02[1]–[2],
9.03[1][d], 10.02[2], 10.04–10.07, 15.18–15.19 (2005).
166
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170

broad duty to inquire is significantly smaller. Under modern trust
conditions and assumptions, the savings in the expected cost of a
breach of trust derived from a broad duty of inquiry are relatively
small.
3.

Economic Conclusion

As applied to the modern trust, the costs of the common law
broad duty of inquiry exceed its benefits. It is overly protective of
trust beneficiaries, cumbersome, and substantially increases
transaction costs. The UPTA and the UTC approaches, which
eliminate the common law broad duty of inquiry when one simply
knows or should know that he or she is dealing with a trustee, are
171
more efficient.
From a doctrinal perspective, the only way to
abolish the common law broad duty of inquiry is to permit third
parties to assume that a trustee has the power to engage in the
proposed transaction. Such an assumption is possible only if: (1)
each trustee is granted all the powers a prudent person would need

170

Before concluding that it would be efficient to eliminate the third party’s duty
to inquire, however, the analysis must take into consideration that there are costs
associated with eliminating the duty. Intuitively, eliminating the duty to inquire will
increase the frequency of breaches. Eliminating the duty of inquiry will also shift the
risk of loss to the trust beneficiaries, who lack the means to effectively take steps to
minimize this risk ex ante. See supra note 67 and infra notes 204–18 and
accompanying text. Under modern trust conditions and assumptions, however, this
increase in frequency should be minimal and the cost of a breach is lower than it was
at common law.
171
If the benefits of eliminating the common law broad duty of inquiry so clearly
exceed the benefits of keeping it, one might ask why so few states adopted the UTPA.
What the UTPA failed to take into consideration was that many of the benefits it
provided had already been achieved under the UFA and the UCC. See supra note 130
and accompanying text. In transactions where the common law rule was the most
cumbersome and expensive—where the transaction needed to be consummated
relatively quickly—statutory action had already been taken to remove the broad duty
of inquiry. The issue then becomes whether the added benefits of extending that
approach to all transactions involving a trustee exceed the costs of completely
eliminating the rule. Included in the costs are the incalculable costs of discarding
the individual settlor’s intent in favor of a generic settlor’s intent as to the scope of
the trustee’s powers, and the macro cost of eliminating one of the few remaining
legal arrangements where personal autonomy remained paramount. See supra note
132 and accompanying text. The analysis becomes much more difficult under these
conditions. This difficulty is complicated by the fact that unlike commercial goods,
for which it is easier to assume that virtually all owners have the same intent with
respect to the scope of their agents’ powers, the class of settlors is not so uniform.
While some settlors no doubt want their trustees to have broad and expansive
powers, owners of protective trusts and trusts to preserve property arguably would
prefer the more traditional common law approach; hence the adoption history of
the UTPA and the current debate over the UTC.
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to manage his or her own property, and (2) the settlor is not
172
permitted to opt out of this assumption.
D. Economic Analysis of the UTC Good Faith, Limited Duty of Inquiry
Although the UTC rejects the common law broad duty of inquiry
just because a third party knows or should know that it is dealing with
a trustee, the UTC does not completely eliminate the duty of inquiry.
While the UTPA provides that third parties are not liable unless they
have actual knowledge that the proposed transaction constitutes a
breach of trust, the UTC protects third parties who deal with a trustee
as long as the third party acts in good faith and gives valuable
173
consideration.
Good faith is not the same as actual knowledge.
174
Actual
Good faith includes actual and constructive knowledge.
175
knowledge does not include constructive knowledge.
An actual
knowledge standard imposes no duty to inquire, even where
suspicious circumstances indicate that the transaction might constitute
176
a breach of trust.
A good faith standard, which the UTC adopts,
177
imposes a duty to inquire under such circumstances. In light of the
added costs inherent in the UTC’s limited duty of inquiry, the
question that logically follows is whether the good faith standard
promotes efficiency.
172

While the Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency requires that settlors not be
permitted to opt out, if a particular settlor were concerned that the trust
beneficiaries were not adequately protected from the risk that the trustee might
engage in a breach of trust, the settlor could require the trustee to post bond. See
Fratcher, supra note 78, at 663.
173
UTC § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004).
174
See Wendel, supra note 130, at 30–35; see also Robert B. Edesess, Jr., The End of
Innocence: An Actual Knowledge Threshold for Intermediaries Holding Fiduciaries’/Clients’
Assets, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 377, 387–88 (2004). A number of rules distinguish
actual knowledge from good faith. If there were no difference between the two,
there would be no reason for statutes to distinguish them. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 201B, § 4 (West 2004) (stating that the death of a principal who has
executed a power of attorney does not invalidate the acts of the attorney who,
without “actual knowledge” of such death, acts in “good faith” under the power).
175
See supra note 111 and accompanying text (quoting the official reporter for the
UTPA acknowledging that the actual knowledge standard does not include
constructive knowledge).
176
See Wendel, supra note 130, at 27–28. States that have adopted provisions of
the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act have expressly rejected the view that the term
“actual knowledge” incorporates “constructive knowledge.” See Wetherill v. Bank IV
Kansas, N.A., 145 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1998); Collier v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 678
So. 2d 693, 697 (Miss. 1996); Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732
(Ct. App. 1992).
177
The exact scope of the duty will depend upon whether courts construe the
UTC’s good faith standard as objective or subjective. See infra note 261 and
accompanying text.
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The Cost of the Limited Duty of Inquiry Under the
Good Faith Requirement

As compared to the actual knowledge/no duty of inquiry
standard under the UTPA, the UTC’s good faith/limited duty of
inquiry standard admittedly imposes higher costs of precautions on
third parties dealing with a trustee. The key to the economic analysis,
however, is the magnitude of those costs. The duty of inquiry under
the good faith standard is a limited duty. The mere fact that one is
dealing with a trustee is not sufficient to trigger the duty. The duty
178
arises only where the third party suspects, or has reason to suspect,
179
This
that the proposed transaction may be inappropriate.
constitutes only a small fraction of the proposed transactions
180
involving a trustee.
The probability that the duty to inquire will
arise is much closer to that of the actual knowledge/no duty of
inquiry regime than it is to the common law broad duty of inquiry
scheme. Absent reason to believe otherwise, the third party is
permitted to presume that the trustee is authorized to engage in the
181
proposed transaction.
2.

The Benefits of the Limited Duty of Inquiry Under the
Good Faith Requirement

While the good faith/limited duty of inquiry standard will
generate greater transaction costs/costs of precaution than the actual
knowledge/no duty of inquiry approach under the UTPA, it will also
generate greater savings. If a third party believes or has reason to
believe that the proposed transaction might constitute a breach of
trust, there is a significantly higher probability that the proposed
transaction does, in fact, constitute a breach of trust. If the proposed
transaction does constitute a breach of trust, permitting the
178

This depends on whether one adopts a subjective or objective standard of good
faith. See infra note 261.
179
See 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 753 (4th
ed. 1918).
180
The costs inherent in this limited duty to inquire are considerably lower than
those inherent in the common law broad duty to inquire. Under the common law
duty, each and every third party who was interested in dealing with a trustee had to
inquire into each and every transaction to ascertain if the transaction was
appropriate. Fratcher, supra note 78, at 664. Assuming that the costs of inquiry are
the same under the common law and the UTC standard, the key is that the
frequency of this type of transaction under the UTC is significantly lower than the
frequency under the common law duty of inquiry. So while the net cost is greater
than under the UTPA standard, it is significantly lower than under the common law
approach (particularly as applied to the modern trust).
181
See UTC § 1012, 7C U.L.A. 261.
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transaction to go forward would result in significant harm to the trust
beneficiaries and should be discouraged. Imposing a limited duty of
inquiry where the third party suspects or has reason to suspect that
the transaction may constitute a breach of trust will reduce the
probability that a trustee will engage in a transaction that constitutes
a breach of trust, thereby reducing the expected costs associated with
182
a breach of trust. The issue that arises is whether these savings are
greater than the costs inherent in imposing a limited duty of inquiry.
3.

Economic Conclusion

Whether imposing the limited duty of inquiry results in a net
reduction in the total expected social costs associated with a breach
of trust is difficult to determine, especially in comparison to the
UTPA’s actual knowledge/no duty of inquiry standard. The good
faith/limited duty of inquiry approach will result in fewer breaches of
trust, but at a slightly higher cost. The actual knowledge/no duty of
inquiry standard will result in more breaches of trust, but at a lower
administrative cost. It is difficult to assign quantitative numbers to
183
the relevant variables, so it is imposible to determine definitively
which approach is more efficient. Nevertheless, the historical success
of the good faith/limited duty of inquiry standard in other areas of
law tends to support the conclusion that the limited duty of inquiry is

182

Under the UTC limited duty of inquiry, the probability that the transaction
constitutes a breach of trust is high, even as applied to the modern trust, due to the
suspicious circumstances that gave rise to the duty.
183
It is impossible to quantify the relevant variables: the respective rate of breach
under the two approaches and the respective costs inherent in each approach. The
costs associated with the good faith limited duty of inquiry depend primarily upon
(1) how often the duty to inquire arises, and (2) the costs associated with the inquiry.
See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. The costs associated with the no duty
of inquiry approach depend primarily upon (1) the increased costs resulting from
the increased number of breaches, and (2) the added costs of posting bond
(depending on how often a settlor would require bond). Fratcher, supra note 78, at
662–63.
While it is impossible to say whether the actual knowledge/no duty of inquiry
standard or the good faith/limited duty of inquiry standard is more efficient, there is
no doubt that the good faith standard has an additional benefit—it is more
equitable. From a purely equitable perspective, it makes no sense to protect a third
party who deals with a trustee and who has reason to suspect that the proposed
transaction is improper, but nonetheless intentionally decides not to investigate so as
to avoid acquiring actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust.
2 POMEROY, supra note 179, at §§ 397–404, 687–88; Wendel, supra note 130, at 63.
Permitting a third party to escape liability under such circumstances arguably
imposes an additional cost: societal disapproval and lack of respect for the legal
system. Assuming it is impossible to say which approach is more efficient, equitable
considerations favor adopting the good faith approach.
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184

the more efficient standard. The general rule is that a third party
who deals with an agent in an unauthorized transaction is liable
185
unless the third party qualifies as a good faith purchaser.
Moreover, the prevailing economic analysis holds that splitting
the liability between the parties who can take precautions to
186
A
minimize the risk of breach is the most efficient approach.
breach of trust is a bilateral risk in that both parties, the settlor who
selects the trustee and the third party who deals with the trustee, can
take precautions to minimize the risk of a breach. Under the
common law approach, which allocated all of the cost associated with
a breach of trust to the third party who participated in the breach, a
settlor had no incentive to take precautions to minimize the risk of a
187
breach.
Similarly, under the UTPA’s actual knowledge approach,
which allocates all of the costs associated with a breach of trust to the
trust beneficiaries, a third party who deals with a trustee has no
188
incentive to take precautions to minimize the risk of a breach. The
good faith standard, however, which bifurcates the risk of loss, creates
184

The UCC employs the good faith standard of liability to an area of law that
involves a high volume of transactions, and where timely consummating the
transaction is also important. U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-304(2), 8-302, 8-304(2) (1977).
The UCC good faith standard of liability has worked well, deterring breaches at an
acceptable cost. One can only assume that the same would be true if the good faith
standard were to apply to third parties interested in dealing with a trustee.
In addition, all things being equal, it makes sense to put the burden of proof on
the party who is in the best position to produce the evidence. See Edward W. Cleary,
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 12 (1959)
(“The nature of a particular element may indicate that evidence relating to it lies
more within the control of one party, which suggests the fairness of allocating that
element to him.”); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil
Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997) (arguing that in
order to minimize the costs to the parties, the most efficient approach would be to
put the burden of proof on the party in control of the information). This reduces
the costs of discovery and ensures that an incentive is created to produce all the
relevant evidence for the jury to consider, thereby maximizing the chances that the
jury will reach the correct verdict. See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72
IND. L.J. 651, 654 (1997) (“We will assume that the court’s objective in allocating the
burden of proof is to minimize two types of costs—more precisely, the sum of the two
costs, which we will call process costs and error costs. Process costs consist of the
resources spent by each party in attempting to secure his preferred result in the case
(by presenting evidence if the case is resolved through litigation . . . ). Error costs
consist of the disadvantageous results produced by an outcome favoring one party
when the evidence supports the other.”) (footnote omitted); see also POSNER, supra
note 1, at 552.
185
See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 289 (2002); 2A C.J.S. Agency §§ 461–62 (2003).
186
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300-11; Cooter, supra note 3, at 6–8, 27–28,
44.
187
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 303; Cooter, supra note 3, at 6, 27.
188
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 304; Cooter, supra note 3, at 5–6, 27–28.
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189

an incentive for bilateral precautions.
All things being equal, the
good faith limited duty of inquiry appears to be the most efficient
standard of liability for a third party dealing with a trustee.
VI. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF THE UTC’S GOOD FAITH STANDARD
But when it comes to a third party who deals with a trustee, all
things are not equal. The economic model developed so far has
focused on the two principal variables in the expected social costs
inherent in a breach of trust—the expected cost of a breach and the
expected costs of the precautions. While these are the key costs
involved in the analysis, there are other, indirect costs. When all
things are equal, these additional indirect costs tend to cancel each
other out. When all things are not equal, however, these added costs
190
may affect which approach is the most efficient.
A. Hindsight Bias
In adopting laws, judicial realism counsels that one should
191
192
consider how people naturally behave.
Courts and juries are
naturally biased in favor of trust beneficiaries and against trustees and
193
third parties who deal with a trustee. This natural bias stems from a
189

Cooter, supra note 3, at 6–8, 27–28, 44; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at
300–11.
190
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 316–20; Cooter, supra note 3, at 37.
191
See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697
(1931) (“[T]he new juristic realists hardly use realism in a technical philosophical
sense. By realism they mean fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as they
are, as contrasted with things as they are imagined to be, or wished to be, or as one
feels they ought to be.”); see also Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning:
Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35
AKRON L. REV. 327, 360 (2002) (“O’Connor’s opinion requires a certain level of legal
realism; that is, a concern for what juries are actually thinking . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222, 1235–36 (1931) (in describing some of the “common points of departure”
that distinguished the realist movement, stating that realists saw “[t]he conception of
law as a means to social ends and not as an end in itself; so that any part needs
constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the
light of both and of their relation to each other”).
192
Historically, trust beneficiaries were not entitled to a trial by jury because their
claims against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, and/or against the third party
for participating in the breach, were equitable in nature. There are exceptions to
this rule, however, and there appears to be a modern trend evolving under which
trust beneficiaries are increasingly receiving the right to a jury trial. See BOGERT,
supra note 27, § 870; 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 197–98 (4th ed. 1988);
see also In re Messer Trust, 579 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Mich. 1998).
193
Professor Alexander, an expert in the field of behavioral law and economics,
was one of the first to write on this phenomenon. He described hindsight bias as
follows:
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number of factors inherent in the historical nature of the trust and
the trust relationship which distinguish the trustee from an agent.
First, while settlors may have entered the “modern trust” era,
most people still hold the “common law” view of the trust. The
typical person (judge or juror included) thinks that the typical trust is
used to help people who need protecting—the elderly, widows,
194
minors, and orphans.
The typical person extends that protective
purpose to the trust property. It too needs to be protected to ensure
that the trust beneficiary is adequately protected. Protecting the trust
195
property favors preserving it.
Transactions involving the trust
property should be kept to a minimum and should be entered into
only with great caution.
The typical person extends the protective purpose of the trust to
the trustee–trust beneficiary relationship as well. Although most

Cognitive psychologists have described the hindsight bias as
individuals’ tendency to consistently exaggerate what, in foresight, they
could have anticipated. It is the persistent tendency of people to
believe that what they know ex post was eminently knowable ex ante.
Or, as one psychologist puts it, “[p]eople believe that others should
have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the
case.”
Gregory Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 782–83 (2000) (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past:
Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). While theoretically hindsight
bias can arise in virtually every case, Professor Alexander asserted that trustees are
routinely subjected to hindsight bias because of their position of dominance over the
trust beneficiaries. Id. at 775, 777. Although Professor Alexander declined to
elaborate on the factors that constitute their position of dominance, they arguably
are the factors discussed herein. See notes 191–214 and accompanying text. This
hindsight bias is not so much against the trustee as it is in favor of the trust
beneficiaries. Thus, if a third party has participated in the breach of trust, the
hindsight bias will apply to both the trustee and the third party.
194
One could argue that this view of who constitutes the typical trust beneficiary is
not limited to laypeople. During a law school faculty workshop presentation, I asked
the faculty in attendance to identify the typical trust beneficiary. The faculty present
rattled off the individuals listed above—the elderly, widows, and orphans. This view
is also reflected in an early comment on the newly adopted Uniform Fiduciaries Act:
“The rules with regard to fiduciaries must of necessity be strict, since they are
generally placed in a position where the incentive to act dishonestly is great, and since
their principals are often inexperienced people, incompetent to protect their own interests.”
Current Legislation, The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 668 (1924)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter The Uniform Fiduciaries Act].
195
The typical layperson’s assumptions about a trust and its purpose are
consistent with the common law view of the typical trust. See supra notes 78–82 and
accompanying text. Although one can make a strong argument that the layperson’s
assumptions about a trust are not accurate as applied to the modern trust, the fact
remains that the typical judge and juror will bring these assumptions to a trial
concerning a third party’s liability for participating in a breach of trust.
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196

people do not understand what a trustee is, per se, or what a
fiduciary relationship is, per se, most people do understand that it is a
special relationship. They understand that trusts are different from
197
other legal arrangements where one party acts for another.
The
typical person translates the concept of fiduciary duties into a vague
198
duty to protect trust beneficiaries.
This vague understanding of
trusts and fiduciary duties is then applied to a third party who deals
with a trustee. The third party knows or should know that trusts are
for the benefit of someone who needs special protection. In deciding
whether a proposed transaction with a trustee is appropriate, the
199
third party should consider the protective nature of trusts.
Second, courts and juries have a natural bias in favor of trust
beneficiaries because the trust beneficiaries do not select the
200
trustee.
In the classic three-party transaction, a third party is
dealing with an agent who is acting on behalf of an owner. If the
agent enters into an unauthorized transaction, there is the equitable
and economic consideration that the owner should be responsible
201
for picking a bad agent.
The owner was in the best position to

196

See Jeanne Trahan Faubell, Book Review, 91 LAW LIBR. J. 441, 479 (1999)
(reviewing JULIE A. CALLIGARO, ARRANGING YOUR FINANCIAL AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: A
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO GETTING YOUR AFFAIRS IN ORDER (1998)) (“[I]n the chapter on
‘Legal Affairs Estate Planning,’ she briefly discusses the living trust, using the terms
‘trust,’ ‘trustee,’ and ‘for the benefit of the beneficiary,’ without ever defining them.
I doubt that most laypersons really understand what these terms mean . . . .”).
197
See BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 11–38.
198
See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
199
The protective nature of trusts is also evident in some of the legal writings
describing trusts and the role of trustees and other fiduciaries. See The Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, supra note 194, at 668 (discussing the protective nature of fiduciary
relationships and stating, “Nor can we shut our eyes to the fact that public policy, as
expressed in judicial decisions over an extended period of time, has favored the
imposition of such burdens [on third parties dealing with a fiduciary] in order that
the interest of beneficiaries might have an additional degree of protection”).
200
The settlor, not the beneficiaries, selects the trustee. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3 (1959). Assuming the settlor is not also a beneficiary, the
beneficiaries have no right to participate in selecting the trustee. See id.
201
As Professor Morris stated:
[A]ltering the principal’s behavior is the primary deterrence
consideration expressed in the agency case law. According to Greenberg
I’s summary of that law, this is because it is the principal who selects,
hires and controls the agent. “[Cases] hold that as between the
employer of a dishonest agent and a stranger (a customer or a holder
in due course), the employer bears the responsibility for it—for it, at
least, could select and monitor the agent. Exposure to liability then
induces the employer to take cost-justified precautions.” As the
authority cited in Greenberg I explains, agency law generally prefers to
provide incentives for principals to select and monitor their agents with
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avoid the problem by selecting a better agent.
With respect to
trusts, however, this argument does not apply. The settlor, not the
203
trust beneficiaries, selects the trustee.
Courts and juries are
reluctant to hold trust beneficiaries responsible for the wrongful acts
204
The third party, on the other
of a trustee they did not choose.
hand, had the power to decide whether to deal with this trustee. The
third party is in a better position to prevent a breach of trust than are
205
the trust beneficiaries.
due care, rather than to require strangers to take additional
precautions with agents.
Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with
Responsibility for Unauthorized Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 370
(internal citations omitted); see also Grease Monkey Int’l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d
468, 477 (Colo. 1995) (“The rationale behind this rule is that it ‘place[s] the risk that
an agent may abuse his authority for his own benefit on the principal, rather than on
the [innocent third party].’ Thus, the rule provides an incentive for a principal to
select reliable agents.” (quoting Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Colo. 1994)
(“There are several policy reasons why it is preferable to place the risk that an agent
may abuse his authority for his own benefit on the principal, rather than on the
holder in due course who takes without notice of the principal–agent relationship.
First, this rule increases the principal’s incentive to exercise care in selecting honest
and reliable agents. Second, the principal is in a better position to supervise the
agent’s conduct than is the holder in due course.”))).
202
See Morris, supra note 201, at 370.
203
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3.
204
See BOGERT, supra note 27, § 882.
It should be noticed, however, that the principal selects his agent and
retains him at will, while the beneficiary merely accepts a trustee
appointed by the settlor or a court and ordinarily has no authority of
his own motion to direct or remove the trustee. The beneficiary is
entitled to rely on the assumption that the trustee will perform his duty
as to labeling trust property and conveying only for trust purposes. It is
more reasonable to expect the principal to be familiar with the method
employed by the agent in handling his property and the transactions of
the agent from day to day than it is to expect a beneficiary to watch and
check the trustee as to method of title holding and as to impending
sales and mortgages by the trustee.
. . . If the beneficiary has had no notice that the trustee was
intending to sell, mortgage, or pledge in breach of trust and that the
trustee was in a position to do this without giving notice of the trust to
the intended purchaser, it is difficult to see how it can be said
reasonably that the deception of the innocent purchaser was the fault
of the beneficiary.
Id.
205
See id. (“There is no duty on the beneficiary to watch the trustee for the benefit
of third persons who may deal with the trustee. The creditor of the trustee, or
purchaser under him, is not entitled to assume that if the property is held in trust the
beneficiary knows of the way in which the title is kept by the trustee and knows of the
reliance of creditors and purchasers on a claim of ownership or power to convey on
the part of the trustee.”); see also Wetherill v. Bank IV Kansas N.A., 145 F.3d 1187,
1192 (10th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that it would have been easier for the third
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Third, courts and juries have a natural bias in favor of trust
beneficiaries because trust beneficiaries have no control over a
trustee. In the classic three-party transaction, after an owner appoints
an agent, the owner has an ongoing duty to supervise the agent’s
206
activities. If the agent enters into an unauthorized transaction, the
third party who dealt with the agent can argue that the owner knew
or should have known that the agent was entering into the
207
transaction, and that the owner should have done a better job
208
supervising the agent.
And if an owner fears that the agent is a
“bad” agent, the owner can and should remove the agent before the
209
agent enters into an unauthorized transaction.
Again, however, these arguments do not apply with equal
effectiveness to trust beneficiaries. One of the principal reasons a
settlor uses a trust is to free the trust beneficiaries from the
210
administrative hassles of holding and managing the property. Trust
beneficiaries are not expected to exercise the same level of
supervision over a trustee that an owner is expected to exercise over

party to have detected the breach of trust, but declining to impose liability on the
third party because the jurisdiction applied the actual knowledge standard).
206
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 201; see also BOGERT, supra note 27, § 882; infra note
208 and accompanying text. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2003).
207
See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text; infra notes 208, 211–13.
208
See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text; infra notes 211–13; see also
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc., 566 So. 2d 1377,
1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“Because the principal–agent relationship is based
upon the trust and confidence of the principal in the agent, and because the
principal is legally liable for the acts of his agent, when a principal no longer has the
necessary confidence in the agent and is no longer willing to be liable for the agent’s
acts, the principal can protect itself by revoking and terminating the agency
relationship . . . .”); POLINSKY, supra note 206, at 130–32 (“If the principal is made
strictly liable for the harm, she will have the appropriate incentive to monitor and
control her agents . . . [I]t still is desirable to make the principal liable for harm, to
give the principal proper incentives to control her agents in any way she can.”); supra
notes 200–01, 203 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 210.
209
Airlines Reporting, 566 So. 2d at 1379.
210
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 379
(5th ed. 1995) (“The settlor may want to be relieved of the burdens of financial
management.”); see also Major Joseph E. Cole, Essential Estate Planning: Tools and
Methodologies for the Military Practitioner, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1999, at 12 (“Furthermore, if
the grantor is looking for professional management or just relief from the headaches
inherent in the management of trust property, [revocable living trusts] can also be
useful to serve that purpose while still providing income to the grantor during the
grantor’s lifetime. The grantor can have another manage the assets for his benefit
without irrevocably giving up control of the assets since the grantor retains the
ultimate power of revocation of the trust.”).
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an agent. And trust beneficiaries have no control over a trustee.
213
While
Trust beneficiaries cannot remove a trustee absent cause.
trust beneficiaries have little control ex ante over a trustee’s actions, a
third party who is contemplating dealing with a trustee has complete
control ex ante over whether to deal with a particular trustee.
Compared to the trust beneficiaries, the third party is in a better
214
position to prevent a breach of trust.
1.

Historical Evidence of Hindsight Bias

There is historical evidence to support the claim that courts and
juries are biased in favor of trust beneficiaries. Professor Fratcher, in
his article calling for each trustee to be granted enhanced powers,
discussed the history behind settlors’ attempts at increasing the scope
of a trustee’s powers. Professor Fratcher subtly, but repeatedly,
criticized the courts for their bias against such attempts. Even where
a settlor expressly granted enhanced powers to his or her trustee, the
courts tended to construe such powers narrowly to protect the
215
interests of trust beneficiaries. In addition, although the traditional
rule was that a trustee had all powers either expressly given or
216
necessarily implied in light of the trust purposes, courts of equity were
217
No doubt this judicial reluctance
reluctant to infer such powers.
211

See BOGERT, supra note 27, § 15 (“An agent is subject to the control and
direction of his principal, whereas neither the settlor nor the beneficiary of a trust
has such a power unless it was expressly reserved or granted in the trust instrument.
Agency is formed with the thought of constant supervision and control by the
principal. Trust is based on the idea of discretion in the trustee and guidance by the
settlor or beneficiary only to the limited extent expressly provided in the trust
instrument.”); see also id. § 882 (“There is no duty on the beneficiary to watch the
trustee for the benefit of third persons who may deal with the trustee.”).
212
See BOGERT, supra note 27, § 882 (“It may be urged that a trustee is like an
agent and that a beneficiary who gives his trustee apparent or actual authority to
convey free of equities should be bound by his grant of power . . . . It should be
noticed, however, that the principal selects his agent and retains him at will, while
the beneficiary merely accepts a trustee appointed by the settlor or a court and
ordinarily has no authority of his own motion to direct or remove the trustee.”).
213
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 (2003); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 527;
3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 27, §§ 107, 107.3 (4th ed. 1988). While the UTC
expands the power of trust beneficiaries to remove a trustee, the power still does not
come close to the degree of control a principal has over an agent. UTC § 706, 7C
U.L.A. 221–22.
214
See The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, supra note 194, at 668 (“[I]t may be argued with
great force that the third party who deals with a fiduciary is in a situation which
affords him an opportunity to investigate and satisfy himself as to the [fiduciary’s]
good faith, whereas the principal may not be in a position to protect himself.”).
215
See Fratcher, supra note 78, at 629 n.11, 634–35, 637–39, 657–58 & 660.
216
See id. at 627.
217
See id. at 627, 630–32, 634 & 657–58.
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was due to the courts’ view that trust beneficiaries are in need of
special protection and the law of trusts should be construed and
218
applied accordingly.
In addition, the traditional approach to a trustee’s liability for
trust investments further supports the position that courts exercise
hindsight bias in favor of trust beneficiaries. At common law, a
trustee’s investments were viewed in isolation and each investment
219
had to be assessed in light of the terms and purpose of the trust.
Because each investment decision was assessed after the fact, trustees
220
were routinely subject to hindsight bias.
218

See The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, supra note 194, at 668 (discussing the protective
nature of fiduciary relationships and stating, “Nor can we shut our eyes to the fact
that public policy, as expressed in judicial decisions over an extended period of time,
has favored the imposition of such burdens [on third parties dealing with a
fiduciary] in order that the interest of beneficiaries might have an additional degree
of protection”); see also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 79, at 1336. This attitude
arguably was consistent with the common law trust and the intent of the common law
settlor—to preserve real property for future beneficiaries. See id. Whether it is
consistent with the modern trust and the intent of the modern settlor is
questionable, but it highlights the tension of the modern trust. No doubt the
settlor’s primary concern is the interest of the trust beneficiaries. The argument,
however, is that at the macro level this interest is best served by facilitating
transactions between the trustee and third parties, even if that increases the risk of a
breach of trust. See Fratcher, supra note 78. Therein lies the tension of the modern
trust. In the event the trust is an investment-oriented commercial trust, the interest
in facilitating trust transactions arguably triumphs. In the event the trust is a more
traditional trust in favor of trust beneficiaries who need protection, however, one
would assume that the typical settlor would prefer to protect the trust beneficiaries’
interests rather than facilitate trust transactions. This difference raises the issue of
the degree to which the UTC drafting committee was influenced by the increasing
role of commercial trusts, as opposed to the more traditional family trust, and to the
extent these two types of trusts differ, which should be assumed to be the model
modern trust for trust law purposes? Alternatively, should there be different laws for
the different types of trusts?
219
Edward C. Halbach, Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 1151, 1151–52 (1992).
220
See Alexander, supra note 193, 782–83 (“Under this rule, courts are supposed
to judge prudence ex ante as opposed to ex post. As Professor Rachlinski has
articulated, however, the truth is that the law governing the liability of trustees for
improperly investing trust assets is best described as an instance of courts falling prey
to the hindsight bias.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). See
generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95–115 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Historical
hindsight bias against a trustee is also evident in the literature discussing the modern
trend portfolio approach to trust investment, which emphasizes that the portfolio
approach eliminates subjecting the trustee to after-the-fact assessment of individual
investment decisions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. b (1992) (“The
trustee’s compliance with these fiduciary standards is to be judged as of the time the
investment decision in question was made, not with the benefit of hindsight or by
taking account of developments that occurred after the time of a decision to make,
retain, or sell an investment.”); see also Robert Aalberts & Percy Poon, The New
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In light of the historical evidence that courts have displayed a
natural bias in favor of trust beneficiaries when interpreting and
applying settlor’s intent with respect to the scope of a trustee’s
powers, it is reasonable to assume that courts and juries will be
equally biased in favor of trust beneficiaries and against third parties
when applying the good faith standard.
2.

Hindsight Bias Is Facilitated by the Nature of the Good
Faith Standard

The fact that courts and juries have a natural bias in favor of
trust beneficiaries is particularly relevant because of the fact-sensitive
and ex post nature of determining liability under the good faith
standard. The fact finder’s task is to determine the third party’s state
221
222
of mind based upon what the party knew, or should have known,
at the time he or she entered into the transaction with the trustee.
Whether the third party acted in good faith is an extremely soft, factsensitive inquiry with plenty of room for interpretation of the
223
evidence.
The court or jury is free to discount the third party’s
testimony as to his or her state of mind if it determines that the
224
testimony is self-serving. There will almost always be evidence and
Prudent Investor Rule and the Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34
AM. BUS. L.J. 39, 64 (1996).
221
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990) (“In common usage, this term
[good faith] is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of
purpose . . . and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or
obligation.”) (emphasis added); see also Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 643 P.2d
1115, 1124 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (“Whether a party acts in good faith depends not
only on the facts and circumstances but also on his state of mind.”) (emphasis added).
222
This distinction depends on whether one takes the subjective or objective
approach to good faith. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
223
See Citizens First Nat’l Bank v. Bluh, 656 A.2d 853, 856–57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995) (‘“[T]he law exacts good faith from those dealing with knowledge of the
representative capacity of another and imposes the obligation to make inquiry into
the propriety of a transaction when it appears that the security offered is not being
applied for the benefit of the estate.’ . . . Such cases are fact sensitive.” (quoting
Petras v. Zaccone, 311 A.2d 751, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973))); State v.
Moreau, 670 A.2d 608, 612 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (“‘Good faith,’ as a
concept, carries with it many different definitions and is almost always highly fact
sensitive. Certainly, good faith contemplates ‘honesty of purpose and integrity of
conduct with respect to a given subject.’”); Cook v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 919 P.2d
56, 60–61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“‘[G]ood faith and fair dealing are fact sensitive
concepts, and whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a
factual issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law.’” (quoting
Republican Group v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994))).
224
Gail Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed
in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 121, 139 (1993) (“Subjective intent can exist only in the mind of the actor, yet
no jury is required to accept the actor’s self-serving testimony as to his intent.”).
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arguments that can be made to support both sides of the issue. In
addition, the jury is assessing the evidence after the fact, and
226
hindsight is always “20–20.”
Where a transaction constitutes a
breach of trust and the trust beneficiaries have been harmed, all
ambiguities and doubts will be resolved against the third party who
dealt with the trustee. For all practical purposes, the fact-sensitive,
good faith standard of liability, when coupled with hindsight bias, will
be tantamount to strict liability—the common law standard of
liability—but without notice to third parties who deal with a trustee of
227
the real potential for liability involved.
3.

Hindsight Bias and Costs of Administration

From an economic perspective, society’s goal is to minimize the
228
total expected social costs associated with a breach of trust.
Although the simple economic model discussed up to this point has
focused on the costs of precautions and the expected cost of harm, a

225

See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
See Alexander, supra note 193, at 782–83; Brett McDonnell, Esops’ Failures:
Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves,
2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 244 (“Furthermore, there’s the danger of 20–20
hindsight vision—judges see a case after events happened, yet they must try to
determine whether an action was justified given the information available at the time
of the decision.”); Rachlinski, supra note 220, at 95.
227
See Alexander, supra note 193, at 778 (“That association [the power imbalance
and the susceptibility of the trust beneficiaries] in turn affects the inferences that
judges draw about the fiduciary. The fiduciary’s (perceived) power superiority,
combined with the difficulty of actually detecting abuses of power, leads judges to
draw inferences against fiduciaries. Moreover, because fiduciaries . . . are expected
to protect their charges when beneficiaries experience losses, judges are apt to blame
the responsible fiduciary. Consequently, judges will resolve questions of doubt
against the fiduciary.”) Juries arguably are just as susceptible to hindsight bias as are
the courts, if not more so. See id. at 783 (“Courts have a pronounced propensity to
evaluate the prudence or imprudence of a trustee’s investment decision on the basis
of information that the trustee could not have known at the time she made the
decision. In trust litigation, trustees who are sued because their trust investments
turned sour and resulted in losses to the beneficiaries have the unenviable challenge
of starting out at the bottom of a deep hole.”). Applying Professor Alexander’s
analysis to a third party who deals with a trustee and where, after the fact, it turns out
the transaction constituted a breach of trust, the third party will “have the unenviable
challenge of starting out at the bottom of a deep hole” while trying to convince the
judge or jury that it acted in good faith.
Once third parties realize that the good faith standard, when coupled with hindsight
bias, is tantamount to strict liability, third parties will resort to the common law’s
broad duty of inquiry to make sure that the trustee is authorized to engage in the
proposed transaction. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 316–20. While this
approach is rational on an individual basis, it is inefficient overall for the reasons
given above. See supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text.
228
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
226

1014

Vol. 35:971

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

more complete economic analysis should include the administrative
costs involved in resolving disputes over which party will bear the loss
229
associated with a breach of trust.
Because the UTC’s good faith
standard is a soft, fact-sensitive standard similar to a negligence
standard, it will, by nature, involve greater administrative costs as
compared to the broad duty of inquiry under the common law
230
Moreover,
approach or the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard.
while random errors in the adjudicative process are assumed to
cancel each other out, excessive and repetitive errors in one direction
or the other do affect the economic analysis and the conduct of the
231
parties. This is why the risk of hindsight bias needs to be factored
into the economic analysis of the efficiency of the UTC’s good faith
standard of liability.
Hindsight bias will result in increased costs for third parties
dealing with a trustee because a court or jury will erroneously hold a
third party liable for participating in a breach of trust. The effect of
repetitive, biased application of a good faith standard is thus to hold
third parties liable where they otherwise would not be. The de facto
result is that the good faith standard will, in practice, be applied
232
more like strict liability.
Third parties will come to recognize the
bias and will respond accordingly—they will take precautions
233
As a result, third parties
consistent with a strict liability standard.
will over-invest in precautions, conducting a broad inquiry before
dealing with a trustee. While efficient from an individual third
party’s perspective, such a high level of precautions is not efficient
from society’s perspective. Once the additional costs of error due to
hindsight bias are factored into the economic analysis, a strong
argument can be made that the actual knowledge standard of liability
234
is more efficient than the good faith standard.
B. Increased Costs of Litigation
235

Even if hindsight bias were not a consideration, a good faith
standard of liability substantially increases litigation costs for third
229

See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 320–23.
Id.
231
Id. at 319–20.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Most courts construe actual knowledge as imposing a high standard of proof—
so high that there is little chance for hindsight bias. See infra notes 239–41 and
accompanying text.
235
Hindsight bias may not be a consideration if the third party can overcome it
(or if the court is not as susceptible to it) or, more likely, if the bias simply does not
230
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parties dealing with a trustee. Anytime a trust beneficiary sues a
trustee for breach of trust, if a third party was even remotely involved
in the underlying activity the third party will be added to the suit as a
236
matter of course.
If the claim against the third party is without
237
merit, the third party can file a motion for summary judgment.
The third party’s chances of prevailing on this motion directly affect
the litigation costs associated with dealing with a trustee.
1.

The Actual Knowledge Standard

Under the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard of liability, the
third party has a very good chance of prevailing on a motion for
summary judgment if the third party has been added to the suit as a
matter of course and there is little evidence to support the claim
238
against it. Most courts impose a high pleading standard for actual
knowledge. Because of this high threshold, courts are more inclined
to rule as a matter of law that a plaintiff/trust beneficiary has not
adequately alleged facts which warrant putting the third party
apply. One of the features of the modern trust is the increasing use of commercial
trusts. Langbein, supra note 113. In such situations, there should not be any
hindsight bias. To the extent hindsight bias is not present in all trust cases, the issue
becomes whether it is better to assume it will be present or not in drafting a law that
will apply to all cases. There are no definitive statistics on which type of trust is more
common: a traditional trust with sympathetic trust beneficiaries or a modern
commercial trust. It is difficult to say, therefore, how often hindsight bias will arise.
Virtually all of the reported cases that arose under the UTPA, however, involved
trusts where hindsight bias would have arisen. See infra notes 245–46 and
accompanying text. A strong case can be made that if there is going to be a breach
of trust, it is more likely to involve a traditional, protective personal trust with
sympathetic trust beneficiaries. Hence, in drafting the law, the more likely scenario
should control.
236
Even if the trust beneficiaries do not have a strong claim against the third
party, they typically will add the third party to the complaint for discovery purposes,
and possibly even for strike-suit settlement purposes. For a discussion of the concept
of strike-suits, see John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77
MICH. L. REV. 63, 66 n.14 (1978).
237
Alternatively, the party might file a motion to dismiss; but the motion for
summary judgment is more likely. See infra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
238
To obtain summary judgment, the court must find that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In assessing the likelihood that a court will
grant a motion for summary judgment, an important factor is who bears the burden
of proof. Martin Louis sums up this consideration as follows:
If the movant bears the burden of proof—either because he is the
plaintiff or because he is asserting an affirmative defense—then he
must establish all essential elements of the claim or defense. If the
movant does not bear the burden of proof, then he can obtain
summary judgment simply by showing the nonexistence of any
essential element of the opposing party’s claim or affirmative defense.
Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Look Analysis, 83 YALE L.J.
745, 747 (1974).
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239

through the time, hassle, and costs of a trial.
The high pleading
threshold also serves to deter trust beneficiaries from adding the
third party to the suit in the first place. Under the UTPA, very few
cases have been brought against a third party for participating in a
breach of trust, and in almost all of them, the third party prevailed on
240
its motion for summary judgment.
Prevailing on a motion for
summary judgment allows the third party to minimize the potential
litigation costs associated with dealing with a trustee.
2.

Good Faith Standard

Under a good faith standard of liability, however, there is (1) a
greater probability that a third party will be sued, and (2) a much
lower chance of prevailing on a motion for summary judgment.
Good faith is such a fact-sensitive standard that the plaintiff bears a
very low threshold of evidence to get his or her day in court. This low
threshold implicitly encourages plaintiffs to bring claims under a
good faith standard, as evidenced by the multitude of cases under the
241
different UCC good faith provisions.
In addition, courts are very
reluctant to grant a motion for summary judgment under a good
242
faith standard. As a result, under a good faith standard of liability,
239

In actual knowledge cases, the issue is fairly black and white—the defendant
must prove only that he or she had no actual knowledge. Wetherill v. Bank IV
Kansas, 145 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying a literal definition to the
term “actual knowledge,” and recognizing the higher evidentiary standard which was
intended to be applied to such transactions); Collier v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 678
So. 2d 693, 696–97 (Miss. 1996); Huber v. Magna Bank, 959 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); see also Edwards v. Northwestern Bank, 250 S.E.2d 651, 656 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1979) (“Determining whether or not a bank acted with ‘actual knowledge’ that
a fiduciary was committing a breach of his obligation presents little difficulty.”).
240
See, e.g., Wetherill, 145 F.3d at 1192; Vournas v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 86
Cal. Rptr. 2d. 490, 497 (Ct. App. 1999); Collier, 678 So. 2d at 696–97; Huber, 959
S.W.2d at 812.
241
See Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Bank’s Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4TH 1026 (1987); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation,
What Constitutes Taking Instrument in Good Faith, and Without Notice of Infirmities or
Defenses, to Support Holder-in-Due-Course Status, Under UCC § 3-302, 36 A.L.R. 4TH 212
(1985); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes “Good Faith” Under UCC § 1-208
Dealing with “Insecure” or “At Will” Acceleration Clauses, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 284 (1991).
242
As a general rule, if a defendant must prove that he acted in good faith, he
bears the burden of proof to establish all elements of his defense on a very factsensitive issue—his state of mind. Percival v. Bruun, 622 P.2d 413, 414 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1981) (“Much depends on the credibility of the witnesses testifying as to their
own state of mind. In these circumstances, the jury should be given the opportunity
to observe the demeanor, during direct and cross-examination, of the witnesses
whose states of mind are at issue. In short, good faith in general . . . is almost always
a question for determination by the fact-finder rather than the court on a motion for
summary judgment.”) (internal citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Dobson
v. Harris, 530 S.E.2d 829, 837 (N.C. 2000).
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a third party who deals with a trustee faces the potential for
significantly increased litigation costs.
The increased litigation costs associated with a good faith
standard will only be exacerbated under the UTC. The UTC fails to
243
define good faith.
The UTC also fails to indicate who bears the
244
burden of proof. Instead, the UTC expressly provides in subsection
1012(e) that “[c]omparable protective provisions of other laws
relating to commercial transactions or transfer of securities by
245
fiduciaries prevail over the protection provided by this section.”
Subsection (e) casts a large shadow over the UTC’s good faith
standard of liability. Most states have a plethora of laws relating to
commercial transactions, some with overlapping and conflicting
protective provisions. Rarely will a state not have another law that
governs the transaction in question.
The drafters of the UTC apparently decided that instead of
attempting to create a uniform standard of liability for third parties
dealing with a trustee, the Code would simply adopt whatever
standard of liability would otherwise apply if the transaction did not
involve a trustee—a rather novel, “chameleon-like” approach to a
243

The official comment to section 1012 expressly acknowledges that the “Code
does not define ‘good faith’ for purposes of [the] section.” See UTC § 1012 cmt., 7C
U.L.A. 261.
244
In that respect, the drafters of the UTC appear to have followed the lead of the
original UCC, although these deficiencies in the UCC have been highly criticized.
The original version of the UCC defined good faith, but it had different definitions
for different scenarios. For a discussion of the wide range of opinions as to what
constitutes good faith, and the UCC drafters’ reluctance to address which party
should bear the burden of proof, see Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential
Approach to Analyzing Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L. REV.
49, 53 n.11, 67–71 (2001); see also Ronald J. Allen & Robert A. Hillman, Evidentiary
Problems in—and Solutions for—the Uniform Commercial Code, 1984 DUKE L.J. 92. The
revised UCC provides one definition for good faith, but this defnition does not apply
to Article 5. See U.C.C. REV. ART. 1 § 1-201, 1 U.L.A. 10–13 (Supp. 2004). The
definition requires both subjective good faith and objective good faith. Id.; see also
infra note 260 and accompanying text. This definition, however, has not been widely
adopted to date.
245
UTC § 1012(e), 7C U.L.A. 261. The comment to section 1012 elaborates on
this point:
This Code does not define “good faith” for purposes of this and the
next section. Defining good faith with reference to the definition used
in the State’s commercial statutes would be consistent with the purpose
of this section, which is to treat commercial transactions with trustees
similar to other commercial transactions.
Id. § 1012 cmt. Both of these provisions fail to indicate directly what is meant by
“commercial” transactions or statutes. For a discussion of the ambiguity inherent in
the root word “commerce,” see Grant S. Nelson & Robert S. Pushaw, Rethinking the
Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but
Preserving State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14–25 (1999).
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“uniform” law. While it is likely that the controlling state law will
246
apply some shade of good faith, there are varying definitions. This
will lead to a “moving target” approach, with different standards
within each state depending on the transaction, and different
standards among the states depending on each state’s commercial
247
statutes.
Subsection 1012(e) also casts doubt on the validity of the UTC’s
distinction, in subsection 1012(a), between a third party who “assists”
248
Typically,
a trustee and a third party who “deals” with a trustee.
state laws do not draw this distinction. To the extent subsection
1012(e) undermines subsection 1012(a), the added protection the
UTC appears to give third parties who only “assist” a trustee may be
illusory, depending on a state’s laws relating to commercial
transactions. The UTC’s ambiguity will lead to even greater litigation
costs.
The logic underlying the UTC approach to section 1012 appears
to be that the only relevant variable is the nature of the transaction,
not the parties to the transaction. That logic, however, overlooks not
only the potential for hindsight bias based on the parties, but also the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act (“UFA”). Approximately half of the states
249
have adopted the UFA.
The UFA provides special protection for
third parties who deal with a fiduciary, including a trustee, not
246

See infra notes 259–63 and accompanying text; see also supra note 244 for a
discussion that is critical of the original version of the UCC for failing to give a
uniform definition of good faith. The UTC approach to good faith is even more
open-ended, expanding the confusion inherent in the term itself to include all
references to the phrase “good faith” in all of a state’s laws relating to commercial
transactions.
247
There are a multitude of laws that may apply depending on the jurisdiction:
the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the Uniform Sales Act,
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the Uniform
Stock Transfers Act, the Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Contract Law, the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, and the Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, etc. This list is not
exhaustive, and it says nothing of the non-uniform laws that may apply. Even if a
court were to refer only to the UCC, it is unclear which UCC definition of good faith
would apply. See supra note 244 for a discussion of the ambiguity with respect to
“good faith” in the UCC alone. If the trust is governed by one state’s laws, but the
third parties are located in—and the transaction occurs in—another state, questions
will arise as to which state’s laws should control; this will produce the antithesis of a
“uniform” law.
248
See UTC § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261. To the extent the UTC recognizes that
parties who merely “assist” a trustee are entitled to greater protection, the best way to
achieve that objective is to grant these parties protection as long as they do not have
actual knowledge of a breach, regardless of whether one rejects the actual knowledge
standard as applied to those who deal with a trustee.
249
See UNIF. FIDUCIARIES ACT (UFA), 7A U.L.A. 364 (2002).
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because of the nature of the transaction, but because of the parties to
the transaction. The UFA provides, as a general rule, that a third
party who deals with a trustee in a whole host of commercial
transactions is not liable for participating in a breach of trust unless
the third party has actual knowledge of the breach or acts in bad
250
faith.
The UTC’s express provision that “[c]omparable protective
provisions of other laws relating to commercial transactions . . .
prevail over the protection provided by this section” arguably means
that in states that have adopted the UFA, for transactions that come
within the scope of the UFA, the UFA’s “actual knowledge or bad
faith” standard, not the UTC’s good faith standard, applies to the
251
third party who dealt with the trustee.
Yet for other transactions
with a trustee that do not come within the scope of the UFA, the
UTC’s good faith standard applies—unless the state has another law
with a different protective provision.
The ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in section 1012 creates
a legal quagmire that will result in substantial litigation costs for third
252
parties who deal with a trustee, and which will undermine the
253
Code’s goal to provide a uniform approach to the law of trusts.
C. Economic Conclusion
From an economic perspective, the UTC’s good faith standard is
inefficient as compared to the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard of
liability. The soft nature of the good faith standard increases the
250

See generally id.
For example, see County of Macon v. Edgcomb, 654 N.E.2d 598, 601–02 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995), where the court acknowledged the different protective standards under
the UFA and the UCC and held that the UFA provision controlled. One can only
assume—based on its express provisions—that if this jurisdiction were to adopt the
UTC, the UFA’s actual knowledge or bad faith standard would still control as to
those transactions with trustees that are within the scope of the UFA.
252
The ambiguity inherent in section 1012’s good faith standard also lessens the
chance that the parties to any litigation involving it will be able to reduce their
litigation costs by settling. Without a good understanding of the respective legal
status of each party’s position, there is less of a chance that the parties will agree on a
common valuation upon which they could settle. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 449–50
(1973). The vast uncertainty as to the meaning of the law also increases the chances
of an erroneous decision following litigation. Id. at 450.
253
Although section 1012 of the UTC creates more uncertainty about the
standard of liability for third parties who participate in a breach of trust, there is one
aspect of section 1012 that is certain—it does not adopt or apply an actual knowledge
standard of liability. See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text. In light of the
success of the actual knowledge standard under the UTPA, one would have expected
the drafters of the UTC to have done a better job of explaining why they were
changing the standard of liability.
251
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probability of litigation. If sued, it is extremely unlikely that the third
party will prevail on a motion for summary judgment, even if the
claim against the third party lacks merit. Coupled with the historical
judicial bias in favor of trust beneficiaries, the good faith standard of
254
liability is tantamount to strict liability.
The third party faces a
significant risk of erroneously being held liable. The third party’s
best chance of prevailing is on appeal—a daunting route that only
further increases the potential litigation costs. The increased
litigation and error costs associated with the UTC’s good faith
standard of liability cast serious doubt on its efficiency. In a perfect
economic world, an actual knowledge standard of liability would thus
be more efficient. It minimizes (1) the risk of hindsight bias, and (2)
the litigation costs associated with dealing with a trustee.
VII. EFFICIENCY OF BAD FAITH VERSUS GOOD FAITH
While a law and economics analysis of the issue of what should
be the standard of liability for a third party participating in a breach
of trust supports the conclusion that the actual knowledge standard is
the most efficient, in the real world values and considerations other
255
than efficiency often enter into the analysis.
Equitable
256
considerations in particular can be influential, and the good faith
standard is admittedly more equitable than the actual knowledge
254

See Rachlinski, supra note 220, at 100.
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 27, 29–31 (explaining that it is unclear what those
values are as applied to the issue of a third party’s liability for participating in a
breach of trust, and that the drafting process that led to the adoption of section 1012
of the UTC does not disclose them); see also Rubin, supra note 2, at 51; supra note 183
and accompanying text. In addition, the law and economics literature acknowledges
that statutory laws tend naturally to be more inefficient than judicially created
doctrines. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 27. A simple explanation of why this may be
true can be found in section 1012 of the UTC. When an issue is being litigated, it is
the sole focus of the parties and the court. The issue is thoroughly briefed and
argued. The court spends a considerable amount of time considering all the
possible ramifications of its ruling. In contrast, the UTC is a comprehensive attempt
at codifying almost all of the law of trusts. See UTC, prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 143–47
(Supp. 2004). Section 1012 is only one section out of almost one hundred, and this
count does not include the many, detailed subsections. One possibility is that not
much attention was paid to section 1012. The Committee also might have reasoned
that there is no difference between good faith, actual knowledge, or bad faith
standards; although the law as it has developed does not support this explanation.
See supra notes 173–77, 239–241 and accompanying text. Unfortunately for third
parties who end up being sued for participating in a breach of trust, the governing
standard of liability seems not to have been a focus of the drafting Committee’s
attention.
256
For several works discussing the question of whether the law does, and should,
favor equity or efficiency, see Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980).
255
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257

standard. Where a third party suspects that a proposed transaction
may constitute a breach of trust, permitting the third party to
258
proceed with impunity is inequitable.
To the extent one believes
that the economic analysis is inconclusive, imposing a limited duty of
inquiry on third parties interested in dealing with a trustee has the
added benefit of being more equitable. To the extent one favors
imposing a limited duty of inquiry on a third party interested in
dealing with a trustee, however, a bad faith standard of liability is a
more efficient way of imposing the limited duty of inquiry.
A. Good Faith Versus Bad Faith Standards of Liability
At an abstract level, the good faith and bad faith standards of
liability are one and the same. Many courts define good faith as the
259
absence of bad faith. Other courts define bad faith as the absence
260
261
of good faith.
Both standards focus on the party’s state of mind
and on whether there is reason to suspect that the conduct in
262
Both standards, in essence, impose a
question is inappropriate.
limited duty of inquiry under the appropriate fact pattern. But while
257

See supra note 183.
See supra note 183.
259
See Thomas v. Sullivan, No. 90-2058, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 896 (4th Cir. Jan.
23, 1991) (unpublished opinion); In re Piper’s Alley Co., 69 B.R. 382, 385 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987); Kuron v. Hamilton, 752 A.2d 752, 758 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000).
260
These two standards are simply flip sides of the same coin. See Sec. Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 238, 242 (8th Cir. 1972); Stetzer v. Dunkin’
Donuts, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 104, 114 (D. Conn. 2000); Cassady-Pierce Co. v. Burns,
169 B.R. 563, 567 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1994).
261
Whether these standards should be defined objectively or subjectively is the
subject of much debate. See Patricia L. Heatherman, Good Faith in Revised Article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Any Change? Should There Be?, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 567,
579 (1993); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940–
49, 51 SMU. L. REV. 275, 322 (1998); Donald B. King, Major Problems with Article 2A:
Unfairness, “Cutting Off” Consumer Defenses, Unfiled Interests, and Even Adoption, 43
MERCER L. REV. 869, 877 (1992). If the standards are defined subjectively, it arguably
is possible that a person may have no state of mind with respect to an issue if he or
she was not aware of the issue, regardless of whether the person should have been
aware. Under the objective approach, if the party should have been aware of the
issue, he or she will be charged with the appropriate state of mind.
262
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 297 cmts. a–g (1959). If there is reason to
suspect that the proposed conduct or transaction is wrongful, but the party fails to
investigate, the party acts in bad faith. “A finding of bad faith is warranted where
(one acts) knowingly and recklessly.” Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th
Cir. 1998). If there is nothing inappropriate about the proposed transaction and
there is no reason to suspect otherwise, the party acts in good faith. See In re
Interstate Cigar Co., 285 B.R. 789, 797 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (defining “‘good faith’
as ‘lack of actual knowledge of actual fraud’ . . . or ‘lack of knowledge of
circumstances requiring further investigation’”).
258
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good faith and bad faith are conceptually and legally flip sides of the
same standard, there are a couple of important practical differences
263
between the two.
1.

Burden of Proof

If a party bears the burden of proof on an element of a rule, the
264
burden creates a de facto presumption.
If the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof as to an element, the burden creates a presumption
that the defendant is not liable unless the plaintiff can meet its
265
burden.
If the defendant bears the burden of proof as to the
element, the burden creates a presumption that the defendant is
266
liable unless the defendant can overcome the presumption.
The general rule is that a good faith standard of liability puts the
267
burden of proof on the party claiming to have acted in good faith.
The party must prove that he or she was “without notice of any
suspicious circumstances which would put a reasonable person on
268
inquiry.”
If the party fails to meet the burden of proof, the party

263

See Russell, supra note 244, at 74 (“The distinction between the good faith and
bad faith standards often seems to be a matter of allocating the burden of proof.”).
In addition, “the choice of a good faith or a bad faith standard is more than a
semantic distinction; it influences the focus of the court’s inquiry and, in close cases,
may determine which party prevails.” Id. at 54.
264
PETER CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 96, at 609 (2d ed. 1947) (“One who must bear
the risk of getting the matter properly before the court, if it is to be considered at all,
has to that extent the dice loaded against him.”); see also Hay, supra note 189, at 654
(“In this setting, the burden of proof is a default rule instructing the court what to do
if neither party presents the evidence. If the plaintiff has the burden of proof, she
loses if no evidence is presented; if the defendant has the burden, he loses if no
evidence is presented.”).
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
92A C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §523 (1997) (“As a general rule, the person
relying on the defense of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice normally has
the burden of proving that defense.”); see also 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser §
524 (2002); BOGERT, supra note 27, § 881 (“Some divergence of judicial opinion has
been expressed with regard to the burden of proving that the legal holder is or is not
a bona fide purchaser. It would seem that ordinarily the necessity to prove not only
the acquisition of legal title, but also the payment of value therefor, and innocence at
the time of payment and of getting title, should rest upon the party who claims that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value in the technical sense . . . . The defendant
should be required to go on and complete the proof of his defense by supplying the
additional elements of payment of value and innocence. These are facts peculiarly
within his knowledge.”). It is assumed that under the UTC a third party will most
likely bear the burden of proof, but the issue is open to debate. See supra note 244
and infra note 271 and accompanying text.
268
Caruso v. Parkos, 637 N.W.2d 351, 359 (Neb. 2002).
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269

loses. The UTC provision that protects a third party who “in good
270
faith and for value” deals with a trustee reads as if it is establishing
an affirmative defense. The burden of proof appears to be on the
271
third party.
If the courts follow the general rule, the burden of
proof will be on the party seeking protection—the third party. The
good faith standard of liability will create a presumption of liability if
the transaction constitutes a breach—a presumption that the third
party can overcome only by proving that he or she acted in good
272
faith.
Where the standard of liability is a bad faith standard, the
general rule is that the party asserting bad faith bears the burden of
269

Id. Meeting this burden is particularly difficult because the party must prove a
negative—that it was without notice of suspicious circumstances. See supra note 263
and accompanying text.
270
UTC § 1012(a), 7C U.L.A. 261. The UTC fails to state which party has the
burden of proof with respect to the issue of the third party’s acting in good faith and
for value. See UTC § 1012 & cmt., 7C U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 2004). The phrasing of the
statutory provision, however, arguably supports the general rule that the burden rests
with the third party who claims to be a good faith purchaser. See supra note 269.
From an economic perspective, because the overwhelming majority of transactions
between trustees and third parties do not constitute a breach of trust, at first blush it
appears illogical to adopt a rule of law that starts with the presumption that the third
party is liable if the transaction, in fact, constitutes a breach of trust. Because the
overwhelming majority of the transactions between a modern trustee and third party
do not constitute a breach of trust, it would appear to be more logical to place the
burden of proof on the party challenging that probability. “A further factor which
seems to enter into many decisions as to allocation is a judicial, i.e., wholly
nonstatistical, estimate of the probabilities of the situation, with the burden being
put on the party who will be benefited by a departure from the supposed norm.”
Cleary, supra note 184, at 12–13 (“Since the plaintiff is the party seeking to disturb
the existing situation by inducing the court to take some measure in his favor, it
seems reasonable to require him to demonstrate his right to relief.”); see also Hay,
supra note 184, at 655–56. In addition, a rule that reduces the incentive for trust
beneficiaries to challenge such transactions would promote overall efficiency.
Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff (i.e., the trust beneficiaries in this
scenario) would increase the costs of litigation for the trust beneficiaries, thereby
decreasing the incentive for trust beneficiaries to sue a third party when a transaction
does not turn out as well as they had hoped. This would promote overall efficiency.
On the other hand, placing the burden of proving good faith on the third party
decreases the costs of litigation for frustrated trust beneficiaries, thereby increasing
the probability that they will bring suit when the trust transactions turn out poorly
for them. Cleary, supra note 184, at 11–12. Applying this reasoning to trust
transactions, the burden of proof arguably should be on the plaintiff to show that the
third party acted in bad faith.
271
Cleary, supra note 184, at 11–12.
272
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 603–04 (“The preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard that governs civil cases directs the trier of fact to find in favor of the party
(usually though not always the plaintiff) who has the burden of proof if that party’s
version of the disputed facts is more probably true than the other party’s version.”) (emphasis
added).
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273

proof.
A bad faith standard of liability creates a de facto
274
presumption that the defendant is not liable. If the plaintiff cannot
carry his or her burden of proof, the plaintiff loses. As applied to a
third party who dealt with a trustee, a bad faith standard of liability
would put the burden of proof on the trust beneficiaries to prove that
275
the third party acted wrongfully in dealing with the trustee.
2.

Costs of Litigation

A bad faith standard of liability also increases the chances that a
third party who is sued without merit can minimize the litigation
costs by prevailing on a motion for summary judgment. Although
bad faith, like good faith, is a fact-sensitive issue that appears
276
inappropriate for resolution on a motion for summary judgment, a
number of courts have granted a third party’s motion for summary
judgment under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act on the grounds that the
plaintiff did not offer adequate evidence showing that the third party
277
acted in bad faith.
There is theoretical support for the courts
distinguishing motions for summary judgment under a bad faith
standard from motions for summary judgment under a good faith
standard. Commentators have argued that courts should take into
consideration whether the moving party bears the burden of proof,
and that courts should be more willing to grant the motion where the
278
movant does not bear the burden of proof.
273

Cases decided based on the Uniform Fiduciaries Act clearly establish that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the third party acted in bad faith. If the
plaintiff is unable to carry its burden the plaintiff loses. See Commercial Sav. Bank of
Sterling v. Baum, 327 P.2d 743, 745 (Colo. 1958) (“The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish actual knowledge and bad faith.”); Union Bank & Trust Co. v.
Girard Trust Co., 161 A. 865, 868 (Pa. 1932) (“As the instrument was good on its
face, there was no apparent reason for inquiry; it remained good until shown to have
been taken in ‘bad faith,’ and the burden of proving that was on plaintiff.”); see also
In re Broadview Lumber Co., 118 F.3d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that in
order to establish liability, the plaintiff “must establish that Mansfield was a fiduciary,
that Mansfield breached his fiduciary duty, and that Mercantile [the third party who
dealt with the alleged fiduciary] had either actual knowledge of the breach or
sufficient facts such that its conduct amounted to bad faith.”).
274
See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
275
See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
276
See supra note 242 and accompanying text; see also New Jersey Title Ins. Co. v.
Caputo, 748 A.2d 507 (N.J. 2000).
277
See In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 751 P.2d 77 (Haw.
1988); Hosselton v. K’s Merch. Mart, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993);
Gibson v. Citizens Nat’l Corp., No. 2003-CA-000243-MR, 2004 WL 1486941 (Ky. Ct.
App. July 2, 2004); Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., Inc. v. Bertram, 746 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2000); Levy v. First Pa. Bank N.A., 487 A.2d 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
278
See, e.g., Louis, supra note 244, at 748.
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B. A Bad Faith Standard Offsets Hindsight Bias
A bad faith standard of liability would go a long way towards
countering the natural bias courts and juries have in favor of trust
beneficiaries and against a third party who deals with a trustee. The
bad faith standard forces the trier of fact to start with a presumption
279
that the third party acted in good faith.
The trust beneficiaries
would bear the burden of proving that the third party acted in bad
280
faith.
As a general rule, bad faith requires more than mere
negligence; bad faith requires that the third party “disregard
circumstances that are suggestive of a breach [of fiduciary duty] and
are sufficiently obvious such that it is in bad faith to remain
281
passive.”
Other courts have defined bad faith as requiring a
“subjective deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of belief or
fear that inquiry would disclose vice or defect in the transaction, an
282
intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears.” Moreover, a
bad faith standard of liability increases the chances that the third
party might be able to minimize the litigation costs by prevailing on a
motion for summary judgment. Even if unsuccessful on the motion,
although the bad faith standard arguably is just as soft and open to
hindsight bias as the good faith standard, the bad faith standard still
requires the court or jury to find that the third party acted in bad
faith; the good faith standard simply requires the court or jury to
conclude that the third party did not persuade them that it acted in
good faith. At a minimum, the “no bad faith” standard gives the
third party a fighting chance at trial. In light of the hindsight bias in
favor of trust beneficiaries, a bad faith standard would decrease the
283
potential for erroneously imposed liability.
Given the UTC’s
objective, which is to treat persons dealing with a trustee as if they
279

See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 275–77 and accompanying text.
281
In re Broadview Lumber Co., 118 F.3d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1997) (defining
“bad faith” as it is used in Missouri’s Uniform Fiduciaries Law); see also United States
v. Manchester Farming P’ship, 315 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003) (defining “bad
faith,” for purposes of recovering attorney’s fees, as “not simply bad judgment or
negligence, but rather [as] impl[ying] the conscious doing of a wrong because of
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . [and] contemplat[ing] a state of mind of
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will”).
282
Attorneys Title Guar. Fund v. Goodman, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (D. Utah
2001); see also UNR-Rohn, Inc. v. Summit Bank, 687 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (“‘Bad faith’ is the antithesis of good faith.”).
283
In the event one concludes that the “no bad faith” standard does not
adequately counter the jury’s natural bias in favor of the trust beneficiaries, then the
standard that one should favor is the “no duty of inquiry/actual knowledge” standard
of liability as recommended by Professor Fratcher. See Fratcher, supra note 78, at
662–63.
280
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were engaged in a transaction not involving trust property, a bad
faith standard of liability does a better job of promoting that objective
than does the good faith standard of liability because the former
takes into consideration the natural bias courts and juries will have in
favor of trust beneficiaries.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The UTC grants broad powers to each trustee and abolishes the
common law broad duty of inquiry. The net effect, vis-à-vis third
parties interested in dealing with a trustee, is to turn each trustee into
an agent. Having transformed the trustee, the UTC then applies the
prevailing standard of liability for third parties interested in dealing
with an agent. Third parties are protected as long as they act in good
faith. The problem is that the UTC does not give trust beneficiaries
the same power and control over the trustee that a principal has over
an agent. Courts and juries intuitively recognize the inequity of
holding trust beneficiaries responsible for the actions of their trustee
when the trust beneficiaries neither select nor control the trustee.
Courts and juries will couple hindsight bias with the fact-sensitive
good faith standard to apply a de facto strict liability standard to third
parties who participate in a breach of trust.
The most efficient way to counter the natural bias courts and
juries have in favor of trust beneficiaries is to adopt an actual
knowledge standard of liability. It is inequitable, however, to allow
third parties who intentionally decide not to investigate suspicious
facts to prevail over trust beneficiaries. A good argument can be
made that a bad faith standard of liability best balances the
competing economic and equitable considerations.
Those
jurisdictions that are inclined to adopt the UTC should consider
revising section 1012 to provide that a third party who deals with a
trustee is not liable unless he or she had actual knowledge of the
breach or acted in bad faith. Those jurisdictions that are inclined to
284

UTC, Overview of Uniform Trust Code, 7C U.L.A. 145–47 (Supp. 2004); UTC
§ 1012 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 229 (Supp. 2004). The UFA employs a “no liability absent
actual knowledge or bad faith” standard of liability. See supra notes 249–51 and
accompanying text. The UFA has proved successful in facilitating transactions
between third parties and fiduciaries. The UFA has successfully balanced the needs
of protecting beneficiaries, while at the same time protecting the interests of third
parties who deal with fiduciaries. The UFA permits third parties to deal with
fiduciaries as they would other agents acting on behalf of a principal. Just as the “no
liability absent actual knowledge or bad faith” standard has been successful in
permitting third parties to deal with fiduciaries, the “no liability absent actual
knowledge or bad faith” standard would permit third parties to deal with trust
property as if the property were not held by a trustee.
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adopt the most efficient approach should consider Professor
Fratcher’s actual knowledge standard.
In those jurisdictions where the Uniform Trust Code’s good
285
faith standard is adopted, from a law and economics perspective
one would predict greater use of trust protectors. A trust protector is
a relatively new development, used primarily in offshore asset
286
protection trusts. A trust protector can be given complete control
over the trust, including the power to terminate the trust or replace
287
the trustee if he or she deems it appropriate.
Inasmuch as the
Uniform Trust Code shifts more of the risk of loss to the trust
beneficiaries, law and economics would predict settlors of private
trusts to respond by increasingly appointing trust protectors to
facilitate greater control and supervision over the trustee—thereby
facilitating greater precautions on behalf of the trust beneficiaries to
288
offset the increased risks they now bear. Where a trust protector is
appointed, however, interesting issues will arise as to the scope of the
289
trust protector’s duty to monitor and supervise the trustee.
No
doubt some trust protectors will charge a fee for their services. In
addition, in the event of a breach of trust, trust beneficiaries will sue
the trust protector in addition to suing the third party who

285

Or even where the UTPA’s actual knowledge standard applies, for that matter.
A trust protector is typically used in the offshore asset protection trust setting
to help insulate the settlor from creditor’s claims and the risk of an unsavory trustee.
Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
287, 309–10 (2002). Typically a settlor appoints a trust protector who is friendly to
the settlor and who it is assumed will follow the settlor’s requests and do what is best
for the settlor. Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on the
Cake?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 399 (1996); Fredrick J. Tansill, Asset Protection Trusts (APTS):
Non-Tax Issues, in INTERNATIONAL TRUST & ESTATE PLANNING 311, 345 (7th Annual
ALI–ABA Advanced Course of Study 2003), available at WL SK024 ALI-ABA 311.
287
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust
Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1916 (1999).
288
The Uniform Trust Code authorizes the use of trust protectors. UTC §
808(b)–(d), 7C U.L.A. 236 (Supp. 2004). The trust beneficiaries can even be given
the power to appoint successor trust protectors, thereby further solidifying the
relationship between the trust protector and the trust beneficiaries and maximizing
the probability that the trust protector will take precautions to protect the interests
of the trust beneficiaries from a breach of trust. Madeline J. Rivlin, Dynasty Trusts, in
PRACTICING LAW INST., ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 947, 961 (Practicing
Law Inst. Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series 2003), available at
WL 325 PLI/Est 947. The use of trust protectors will also reduce the dominance the
trustee holds over the trust beneficiaries, thereby reducing the potential for
hindsight bias—or possibly expanding it to include the trust protector. See supra note
193.
289
The Uniform Trust Code provides that the default rule is that a trust protector
owes the relevant parties a fiduciary duty, but the settlor may opt out of the default
rule. UTC § 808 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 236–37 (Supp. 2004).
286
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participated in the breach of trust. The use of trust protectors will
only further increase the costs of administration associated with the
good faith standard.
Maybe Professor Fratcher was not so wrong after all.

